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INTRODUCTION 
The traditional view of the first amendment's free speech guarantee as 
absolute, allowing few and narrow exceptions, reflects the Constitution's ded-
ication to an open and unfettered exchange of ideas. Those thoughts that are 
abhorrent to a free society, the argument goes, will wither when aired but 
fester if suppressed. Moreover, who is to decide which ideas are offensive? 
The interests of the state may well be inferior to those of the people, the 
wisdom of public servants often suspect in quality and motivation. But freedom 
of speech is so precious and delicate a liberty it must be preserved at great 
cost: thus the depth of conviction in Voltaire's oft-quoted declaration, "I 
disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say 
it. "I 
One may not justify a rule of absolute construction merely by asserting 
that it is difficult to draw a line between acceptable and nonacceptable expres-
sion or to allocate responsibility for deciding what speech requires restriction. 
The carefully delineated exceptions to the rule of free speech, such as obscenity, 
libel and fighting words, as well as the recognition of legitimate time, place 
and manner restrictions are all based on the premise that the first amendment 
was not intended to protect certain utterances. In recent years there has been 
growing support for yet another exception: the destructive attack on a target 
group of people by stimulating hatred or fear in others, i.e., racial defamation. 1 
Does such a restriction pass constitutional muster? Thirty years ago in 
Beauhamais v. Illinois ,:1 the Court answered that question in the affirmative. 
Although Beauhamais has not been overruled, recent opinions have questioned 
its vitality. 4 Subsequent changes in the law of libel have led some to believe 
that group libel statutes would not survive constitutional challenge today." In 
I. There is some doubt Voltaire actually uttered those famous words but they do reflect 
an attitude attributed to him by S.G. Tallentryre (E. Beatrice Hall), an English writer, in her 
book, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1906). See STEVENSON, THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 
726, 2276 (1958). For judicial usc of the quote, sec, e.g., People v. Kieran, 6 Misc. 2d 245, 
26 N. Y. S. 2d 291, 307 (1940). See also infra notes 65-86 and accompanying text. 
2. Making racial defamation an actionable tort, whether under the rubric of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress or otherwise, has been the subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., 
Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, (1982); Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words That Wound," 18 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 (1983); and Delgado, Professor Delgado Replies, 18 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 593 (1983). But the discussion too often takes for granted the constitutional validity 
of tort liability. This article seeks to address more thoroughly the first amendment difficulties 
involved. 
3. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
4. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. F.C.C., 403 F.2d 169, 173, 174 
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Skelly Wright, J., concurring), urt. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Toilet 
v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 (8th Cir. 1973), United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 
1267, 1277 (D. Md. 1974). 
5. Id. 
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Collin v. Smith,'; furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the enforceability of a similar ordinance enacted to prevent the Amer-
ican Nazi Party from demonstrating in Skokie, Illinois. The Court denied 
certiorari,7 thereby preserving, presumably, the sanctity of freedom of speech. 
Do ugly ideas wither when aired, or is this reasoning naive? This article 
will examine the relationship between racial defamation and freedom of speech. 
It will compare American libel law with that of several countries where 
restrictive statutes have long been in place, and will draw conclusions as to 
the moral, social, and practical value of laws that allow the state to punish 
racial defamation and permit the courts to limit that form of speech." 
I. THE NAZIS IN SKOKIE 
The last time a federal appeals court considered the constitutionality of 
a group libel statute was in 1978, when a group of American Nazis attempted 
to march in Skokie, Illinois.!' The landmark case that ensued, Collin v. Smith, III 
is illustrative of the complex difficulties the courts have encountered in dealing 
with such laws. 
A. A Brief Chronology" 
Skokie, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, has a population over 70,000'~ of 
which some 45,000 are Jewish.':1 In early 1977, Frank Collin, a self-styled 
leader of the American Nazi Party, a right wing extremist group that espouses 
anti-semitism,'4 applied for permits to demonstrate in various Chicago suburbs 
6. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), art. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978). 
7. 436 U.S. 953 (1978). 
8. While the primary focus of this article is the constitutionality of criminal group libel 
statutes, the same arguments apply to the constitutionality of civil actions. For a justification of 
such lawsuits, see Note, Group Defamation and Individual Actions: A New Look at an Old Rule, 71 
CALIF. L. REV. 1532 (1983). 
9. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
10. /d. 
11. The events that took place in Skokie, Illinois, between March 1977 and June 1978 
have been documented in detail elsewhere; likewise, the purposes and passions of the principles 
involved have been speculated upon and analyzed in depth. Which parties won the battles, and 
who won the war, continue to be hotly debated questions. What follows in this subsection, 
therefore, is a brief chronological summary, together with some editorial conclusions based upon 
a consensus of the commentators and the writer's own admitted biases. See A. NEIER, DEFENDING 
My ENEMY (1979); Hamlin, Swastikas and Survivors, 4 CIV. LIB. REV. 8 (Mar.- Apr. 1978). See 
also Danon, Illinois Supreme Court and the Appellate Court Decisions Regarding Prior Restraint, in Skokie 
v. The American Nazi Party, 67 Ill. B.J. 540-49 (1979); Horowitz & Bramson, Skokie, The ACLU 
and the Endurance of Democratic Theory, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 328-48 (1979). 
12. NEIER, supra note 11, at 39. 
13. Hamlin, supra note 11, at 12. 
14. NEIER discusses the various splinter groups within the nco-Nazi fascist fringe in the 
United States since the Second World War, among them the American Nazi Party, the National 
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for the stated purpose of attracting attention to his "cause." ", One reason he 
viewed Skokie as an ideal target was that a significant number of its townspeople 
had survived the horrendous ordeal of Nazi concentration camps.16 
In retrospect, the immediate and outraged response of the residents of 
Skokie helped Collin accomplish his goal. The other communities approached 
by the Nazis had rebuffed them by way of innocuous demurrers: "We are 
unable to accommodate you at this time," or "the space that you require 
has been previously reserved." 17 Skokie, however, sought to use a legalistic 
device: it would acquiesce in the Nazis' request if the group posted a large 
insurance bond. 18 Such a requirement, of course, would be difficult if not 
impossible for Collin and his followers to meet. 19 
The American Nazi Party had already been successful in challenging 
similar bonding requirements,211 and Collin recognized that he was in a fa-
vorable legal position to attract considerable attention to the Party and irritate 
a sizeable number of Jews in the process. On March 20, 1977, he sent a letter 
to the town announcing that his people would picket the Skokie municipal 
building to protest the denial of the permit.21 
The Village of Skokie sued to enjoin the demonstration, and an Illinois 
court issued an injunction prohibiting Collin's group from either marching or 
displaying a swastika. 22 
The Nazis, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, appealed,2'l 
but no Illinois appellate court would either stay the injunction pending appeal 
or grant an expedited review of the trial court's decision. H The AC L U then 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In a per curiam opinion, the 
Court held that prior restraints on free expression are valid only if accompanied 
by strict procedural safeguards, including immediate appellate review; in the 
absence of such safeguards, a state appellate court must stay an injunction/' 
Renaissance Party, and the National Socialists White People's Party. The American Nazi Party 
under Collin claimed to have 40 members. NEIER, supra note II, at 13-16. 
15. Hamlin, supra note 11. 
16. !d. 
17. !d. at 13. 
18. !d. at 13. The bond was in the amount of $350,000. 
19. /d. at 13. 
20. NEIER, supra note 11, at 38-39. 
21. !d. 
22. !d. 
23. Id. at 48; see also National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 
(1977). 
24. See National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). 
25. !d. Justice White would have denied the stay. Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and Chief 
Justice Burger dissented on the grounds that no final state court decision had been rendered. !d. 
at 44-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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On remand, the intermediate appellate court modified its injunction, permitting 
the Nazis to demonstrate as long as they did not display the swastika. ~'i 
The ACLU persisted on the grounds that the Nazis' activity, while 
abhorrent, was nevertheless speech protected by the Constitution. This time 
the Illinois Court concluded that the injunction should be vacated in its 
en tirety . 17 
Meanwhile, the Village of Skokie had passed several new ordinances 
aimed at keeping the Nazis out of the town. The ordinances provided, inter 
alia, that groups must obtain permits and insurance bonds before holding any 
public parade or assembly, that the dissemination of material intended to 
incite racial or religious hatred was forbidden, as were public demonstrations 
by political parties whose members wore military uniforms. ~H 
Passage of these ordinances brought the inevitable constitutional challenge 
from Collin and the ACLU; this time, however, a federal district court found 
the laws unconstitutional.~!1 Predictably, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the re-
sult;'" and the Court denied certiorari.'" 
While the Court upheld the Nazis' right to march in Skokie, they never 
did so. Yet Collin had already achieved his goal: he attracted national attention 
to his controversial cause by provoking the people of Skokie into visible 
outrage.:'~ 
B. The Failed Constitutional Arguments 
The Village of Skokie attempted to prevent the Nazis from marching 
through the municipality in their uniforms. It failed because it was unable to 
articulate precisely why the first amendment should not protect this form of 
"speech." In retrospect, it is not difficult to understand why the traditional 
exceptions to the free speech rule were invoked unsuccessfully. 
Under the "fighting words" doctrine, first enunciated by the Court in 
1942/' utterances directed to an individual who has not voluntarily exposed 
himself to invective are deemed the practical equivalent of speech aimed at 
a "captive audience" posing a "clear and present" danger to listeners. The 
26. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 51 Ill. App. 3d 279 (1977), rev'd 
in pari, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
27. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 
(1978). 
28. VILLAGE OF SKOKIE, ILL., MUN. ORO. H 994-996 (1977). See also NEIER, supra note 
11, at 48-49. 
29. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), aJl'd., 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), mi. 
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
30. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th CiL), uri. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
3\. 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
32. See NEIER, supra note 11, at 58-62. 
33. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
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most famous example was provided by Justice Holmes: "The most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in 
a theatre and causing a panic. ":14 Theater patrons are captive (having no 
advance warning of a statement or demonstration, they cannot avoid it), the 
message is false,:l" and any opposing speech would be ineffective. "Fighting 
words" have the same elements of surprise, and will likely provoke a response 
(violence, as opposed to panic) from a captive listener who has no chance to 
avoid listening. In Collin, however, the Seventh Circuit held that the "fighting 
words" doctrine was inappropriate in that both the speakers (Nazis) and the 
listeners (the populace of Skokie) were groups. The doctrine of fighting words 
requires individual, one-on-one provocation; the court would not accept the 
argument that the Nazis' symbolic anti-Semitic speech constituted fighting 
words directed against each Jew in Skokie.:l6 Furthermore, the advance publicity 
of the parade eliminated the element of surprise,") and no resident was forced 
to witness the Nazi march; knowing in advance that the swastika would be 
displayed in the town square (usually deserted on weekends, anyway), those 
offended could easily avoid seeing it by staying away."H 
Similarly, the Village conceded that no well-founded fear of responsive 
violence justified the ordinances, and that there likely would be no physical 
violence if the march were held."<' The ordinances did not refer to a breach 
of the peace. 41' "This confession," wrote the court, "takes this case out of the 
scope of Brandenburg v. Ohio" ... and Feiner v. New York42 (intentional 'in-
34. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
35. It should be stressed that this criterion loses its value when the speech contains 
statements that are not verifiably true or false but are expressions of doctrine or opinion. It is 
the immediacy of the message that permits it to inflict damage before opposing speech can counter 
its effects. 
36. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill. 2d 605, 615, 373 N.E. 
2d 21 (1978). However, in his dissent to the denial of certiorari, Justice Blackmun came close 
to indicating that he would hold on the merits for Skokie, on the basis of such a likely eventuality. 
There was evidence of a "potentially explosive and dangerous situation, inflamed by unforgettable 
recollections," into which the Nazis would deliberately come, "taunting and overwhelmingly 
offensive." At the very least, it is clear from this that Justice Blackmun would be receptive to 
arguments so framed. 439 U.S. at 918 (1978). See the discussion in Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari 
Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1265 (1979). Set also F.S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A 
FREE SOCIETY 92 (1981). 
37. If uniformed Nazis stormed a synagogue during services, shouting "heil Hitler," the 
situation would obviously be different. See NEIER, supra note II, at 141. 
38. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill. 2d at 618, 373 N.E.2d 
at 25-26 (1978). 
39. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978). The Village agreed to make 
every effort to protect the demonstrators from responsive violence. /d. at 1203 n. 10. 
40. Even if it did, the statute as written would have failed for overbreadth and vagueness. 
ld. at 1203 n .11. 
41. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
42. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
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citement to riot' may be prohibited). ,,~:, Thus, the court never addressed the 
issue of extending the fighting words doctrine to apply to group libel." Skokie's 
"fighting words" argument was doomed from the start. 
For many of the same reasons, the clear and present danger argument4:, 
also failed. Advocacy of a viewpoint may cross the line between public peace-
and-order and overt acts. Should the line be crossed, the incitement to riot 
becomes "a substantive evil" which the state has a right to prevent. 46 But in 
such a case the speaker must be inciting listeners to imminent lawless action 
against a third party and stand a reasonable likelihood of success. 47 These 
elements were not present in Skokie: any violence occurring there would have 
been directed against the speaker, not against others as a result of his speech. 
Incitement to riot may only be controlled if rioting is the speaker's very 
purpose. Thus the incitement-to-riot exception cannot apply to a hostile (even 
violent) reaction by those who simply oppose the speaker's views. In other 
words, speech is limited only where there exists a clear and present danger 
that the speaker's exhortations will result in violence directed towards others, 
not when the visceral reaction of the audience against the speaker gives rise 
to the violence. To treat such speech any differently would render it subject 
to the "heckler's veto," thereby making legitimate but unpopular expression 
(for example, advocacy of busing to achieve racial integration) legally sup-
pressible. 4K 
43. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir.), stay deni(d, 436 U.S. 953, urt. dnzi(d, 
439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
44. Justice Brennan, in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 (1964), suggests that 
group vilification likely to lead to public disorder is not protected speech. 
45. Discussion of these four words is plentiful. &( J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 107· 
8 (1980); Linde, "Cl(arand Pwent" Dang" R(()Camimd, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970); Nathanson, 
Th( Communist Trials and tM Cl(ar and Pment Dang" T(st, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1167 (1950); Redish, 
Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and th( First Amendment, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159 (1982). There is no 
scarcity of discussion of this subject in the United States Reports. &(, (.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n 
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (applying a somewhat differently articulated clear and present 
danger test); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 
242, 255-58 (1937). 
46. Although the clear and present danger exception is frequently abbreviated to those 
four words, the meaning of Justice Holmes' formulation is lost if the remainder of the test is 
overlooked: "danger that they will bring about the subslantiv( (viis that Congms has a righlto pt(uent." 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added) may not constitute a bright 
line, but it clarifies the limited nature of the exception, as the word "danger" does not. 
47. Mere advocacy of abstract tioctrin(s is not actionable. Su Yates v. United States, 354 
U.S. 298 (1957). 
48. Unfortunately, the Court's application of this distinction has been difficult. In Feiner 
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (/951), the Court went through a tortuous causal analysis to justify 
Feiner's arrest. Feiner had taken to a street corner in Syracuse to voice his displeasure with what 
he perceived to be racist policies in the city government. An onlooker threatened to attack him 
if the police officer present did not interrupt the discourse. The officer responded, arresting Feiner 
for a breach of the peace. His subsequent conviction was upheld by two New York State appellate 
18 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:11 
The above-mentioned exceptions are all context-based. That is, what the 
speaker actually says is not directly at issue, but because of the circumstances 
in which the speech is made it may be punished (or, in rare circumstances, 
prevented altogether).49 Thus, it would be hard to characterize utterances 
spoken with a disarming smile as fighting words. ,,0 Likewise, if there is no 
receptive audience to spur on, advocacy of even imminent lawless action is 
probably protected.'" And if the listeners reasonably can anticipate what they 
will hear, they are not captive. ,,2 
The Court has ruled that speech may be subject to reasonable time, place 
and manner restrictions,":! as long as such restrictions are not too broad and 
do not permit administrative discretion that could become in effect a veto 
power.:;4 Thus, although the content of the proposed speech cannot be a factor 
courts, and the Court affirmed. Ste genually L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 617-23 
(1978); Note, Frte Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 489 (1951). 
49. While a law that prohibits certain types of expression may chill the righls themselves, 
through the prospect of punishment for violation, a prior restraint in the form of an injunction 
effectively freezes them. Where fully protected speech is at issue, (see infra text accompanying 
notes 117-28), virtually no prior restraints will ever be issued except in the context of a judicial 
"gag order" (which itself is subject to a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality). The rationale 
militating against prior restraints under the above mentioned exceptions is that a danger cannot 
be clear or present until the words in question are uttered - and that words still unspoken 
cannot be considered to be provocative of violence. Cases allowing prior restraints have been 
limited to those involving national security, United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 
(W.D. Wis.), TTUlntiJJmus denied sub nom. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979); Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (dictum); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713,721- 23 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); preservation of fairness of criminal trials, Sheppard 
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (dictum); and obscenity, Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 
U.S. 436 (1957). BuJ Stt Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). It appears that only the 
most serious or highly probable dangers justify a prior restraint of protected speech. 
50. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
51. Me Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 ( 1973) (disorderly conduct charges disfavored as 
a means of abridging speech). Cj Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (criminal syndicalism 
statute fatally overbroad). These cases impose a stricter standard upon the government than did 
an earlier line in which the danger exception was first developed. See Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652 (1925). Subversive association and expression now requires the elements of imminence 
and likely success. See M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 55 (1966). 
52. See N. DORSEN, P. ORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, I POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 627 (4th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited ·as P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNEj; Note, 
"Offensive Speech" and the First Amendment, 53 B.U.L. REV. 834, 848 (1973) (discussing Brown v. 
Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972). The captive audience doctrine presupposes thaI the listener 
expects privacy and wishes to minimize surprise. 
53. Me Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
54. Permissible time, place, and manner restrictions may include a permit requirement 
for public parades and demonstrations. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). However, 
such permits must not be allocated in a discriminatory fashion. Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
mingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1941). For speech to have first amendment protection, it must take 
place in a generally recognizable forum. Me, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (no 
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in the decision whether or not to issue a permit,55 a speaker may be punished 
constitutionally if the context of his speech violates reasonable regulations that 
are duly authorized and implemented. 56 
The Skokie ordinance by which the municipal government sought to 
prevent the Nazi parade was indeed a time, place, and manner regulation,57 
but it amounted to putting the entire community off-limits to the Nazis forever. 
Thus, it fell far outside permissible standards for restraint. 58 
In fact, what the Village of Skokie wanted to do was to stop the Nazis 
on the basis of the content of their symbolic speech. Thus, they mistakenly 
utilized context-based exceptions to the guarantee of free speech. Though 
contextual restrictions have always been a more acceptable vehicle for speech 
regulation than those based on content,59 the Village needed to directly address 
the issue of the "speech" itself. 
In Skokie, the speakers sought purposefully to tap a vast reservoir of 
shock and moral abhorrence by conjuring up vivid images of the evils per-
petrated by Nazi Germany. They were well aware that the memories of the 
Holocaust survivors remain indelible and excruciating. They understood fully 
the publicity value of the venture if their "threat" bore any credence in the 
minds of community residents. On the other hand, the citizens of Skokie felt 
that a symbolic victory over the American Nazis would amount to an important 
repudiation of Nazism. 
Had the citizens of Skokie attacked the Nazis' demonstration on its merits 
(as opposed to its time, place, and manner), their constitutional arguments 
constitutional right to hold protest at state penitentiary); Hague v. C.1.0., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); 
Kalven, The Concept oj Public Forum, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Note, A Unitary Approach To First 
Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1982). Similarly, handbills 
placed in mailboxes are not protected. United States Postal Servo V. Council of Greenburg Civic 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114 (1981). A state may prohibit writing on walls of public buildings. Metromedia, 
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 549-50 (1981) (Stevens, J. dissenting in part). 
55. Hague v. C.1.0., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Rockwell v.Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-282, 
211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35, aff'd., 10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cm. denied, 
368 U.S. 913 (1961). See Stone, Restrictions on Speech Because of Its Content, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 
81 (1978). 
56. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). If the Nazis marched through Skokie's 
residential streets with a sound truck, blasting out anti-semitic epithets, the speech could be 
interrupted and punished. 
57. See text accompanying note 28, supra. 
58. See the discussion in NEIER, supra note II, at 115, concerning the attempt by the 
mayor of Jersey City to put the city off-limits to labor organizers. Hague v. C.1.0., 307 U.S. 
496 (1939). 
59. The disfavored nature of content-based restrictions seems to be a universally accepted 
element of American constitutional jurisprudence. Set, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 
408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). See the excellent explanation in Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review oj the 
Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 139-48 (1982). But see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 765 (1982) (content of speech must be examined to determine if it is protected by the first 
amendment). Su infra text accompanying notes 86-93. 
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may have prevailed. Some speech may be regulated according to its content, 
as the obscenity laws and the "fighting words" doctrine demonstrate. Had 
they properly framed the issue, they might have restrained the Nazis within con-
stitutional bounds. 
II. THEORIES OF FREE SPEECH 
A persistent strain in first amendment jurisprudence is that free speech 
gives everyone the right to speak his or her mind, that the Constitution 
guarantees absolute freedom of self expression, and anything that restricts this 
right is the first step on the road to tyranny.6<1 That "no law (abridging the 
freedom of speech) means no law" was the position of Justices Black and 
Douglas. 61 In the vernacular, "it's a free country, and I can say whatever I 
please. " 
The very existence of exceptions, e.g., fighting words, clear and present 
danger, captive audience, as well as the established constitutionality of time, 
place and manner restrictions serve to belie the popular understanding of free 
speech. Each, however, restricts speech on the basis of context; hence, the 
idea persists that content cannot be regulated. Speech, after all, is merely the 
verbal expression of the speaker's thoughts, beliefs, and opinions, and it is 
unarguable that in the United States there is absolute freedom to think. But 
it follows neither legally, logically, nor philosopically that one may openly 
express whatever he or she thinks, whenever and wherever he or she wants. 62 
The source of this basic confusion is the familiar word "speech" itself. 
Constitutionally, speech must be understood as a term or act. 6:1 As one com-
mentator suggests, the ordinary meaning of speech is both overinclusive and 
underinclusive, i.e., telling military secrets to an enemy agent is unprotected 
speech, but the silent and symbolic wearing of an armband is protected. 64 
60. "Another such victory," wrote Justice Black, "and I am undone." See dissenting 
opinion in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267-75 (1952). Unless Justice Black could 
categorize the speech at issue as other than "pure," Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community 
School Dis!., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (dissenting), Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), he 
responded to any abridgment with this road-to-doom scenario. 
61. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-18 (1971) (Black, J., 
concurring). See also W.O. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 362 (1954). For criticism of the 
absolutist theory, set W. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 149 (1957). 
62. See State v. Dixon, 78 Wash. 2d 796, 479 P.2d 931, 938 (1971); Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison Uuly 31, 1788), reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 141 (Dumbauld ed. 1955) (discussing liability of publishers for printing false facts, 
despite freedom of the press, and criminal acts dictated by religious error as punishable despite 
free exercise of religion guarantee) [hereinafter cited as JEFFERSON). 
63. Set generally Schauer, Speech and "Speech" - Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the 
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 889, 906 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schauer, 
Speech). 
64. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dis!., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Accord 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1939) (flag display). Set generally Alfrange, Fret Speech and 
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Recognition that the first amendment protects a particular type of speech leads 
logically to the inquiry: what are the parameters of action and utterance to 
be protected against abridgement? 
A. "The Intent of the Framers" 
Traditionally, interpretation of the Constitution begins with studying the 
intent of its Framers. Much has been made of Thomas Jefferson's libertarian 
perspective on free speech: the best way to deal with error is to permit its 
correction by truth. 65 "The bar of public reason"66 will generally provide the 
remedy for abuses occasioned by the unfettered dissemination of information. 
Only when the security and peace of society is threatened, Jefferson believed, 
should the discussion of political, economic, and social affairs be restrained. 67 
James Madison, often called the architect of the Bill of Rights, wrote in The 
Federalist that freedom of speech (and of the press) would make possible a 
citizenry governed by reason that would in turn keep the government in 
check. fiR 
However, the most recent historical scholarship concludes that no clear 
"intent" underlying the first amendment can be identified. 69 The Framers 
conceived the Constitution as an instrument dealing with the relationship of 
the state governments to the newly established "general government." The 
rights and responsibilities of individuals lay primarily in relation to state 
governments, whose respective constitutions protected freedom of speech and 
press. 7() The drafters of the Constitution carved out expressly designated powers 
of the federal government from state power. Not all freedoms were easily 
recognized. On the final day of the Constitutional Convention, for example, 
Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 
COLUM. L. REV. 1091 (1968); Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321, 
362 (1979) (racial friction generated by the wearing of buttons proclaiming "White is right" and 
"Happy Easter, Dr. King" led Sixth Circuit to uphold school rule banning all buttons, even 
though this banned students from wearing buttons protesting the Vietnamese War). 
65. DOUGLAS, supra note 61, at 362 (quoting Thomas Jefferson on free speech). Jefferson 
is quoted as having said "truth is great and will prevail if left to herself." Much later, Justice 
William O. Douglas wrote that "grievances ... aired do not become as virulent as grievances 
that are suppressed or driven underground." W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 61, at 363. 
66. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801), reprinted in JEFFERSON, 
supra note 62, at 44. 
67. DOUGLAS, supra note 61, at 362. Justice Douglas interpreted Jefferson's meaning as 
in accord with his own "absolutist" stance. But the argument made by the state in favor of a'!)' 
given abridgment of speech is inequitably that social peace and security is being threatened. See 
infra discussion in text accompanying notes 109-12. 
68. Finnis, "Reason and Passion ": The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 
U. PA. L. REV. 222, 229-30 (1967). 
69. See J. MACG. BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 60-62 (1982); BeVier, The First 
Amendment and Political Speech: An lTUJuiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 
299 (1978); Haiman, How Much of Our Speech Is Free?, 2 CIV. LIB. REV. Ill, 113 (1975). 
70. BURNS, supra note 69, at 539-40. 
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a provision that "the liberty of the Press should inviolably be observed" was 
proposed and promptly voted down because, the delegates wrote, "[i]t is 
unnecessary - the power of Congress does not extend to the Press. "71 Even-
tually, the Bill of Rights was adopted, but only partially as an additional 
guarantor of liberty;72 it primarify functioned as a bargaining chip to procure 
state ratification. 7:1 
This does not diminish the importance of the Bill of Rights, but merely 
cautions against the expectation that understanding the "intent of the Framers" 
resolves the question of precisely what the Framers sought to protect by the 
first amendment. In fact, there was no extensive, carefully considered debate 
on the subject. The governing principle of the American Revolution was less 
individual freedom than self-government. 74 
For some constitutional scholars, the principle of self-government suf-
ficiently identifies the parameters of the first amendment: Congress is forbidden 
from abridging "the freedom of a citizen's speech ... whenever (it has 
anything to do with) the governing of the nation. "75 The governing function 
is interpreted broadly, to include political, economic, and social issues. 76 Put 
more succinctly, the first amendment encompasses "the free and robust ex-
change of ideas and political debate. "77 The federal system of checks and 
balances, together with the state-federal division of authority, was devised to 
prevent government from presenting a unified and, thus, more easily tyran-
nical, front against the people. 78 
Similarly, the various guarantees of the Bill of Rights effectively prevent 
a "tyranny of opinion" from being concentrated in anyone institution or 
person, and serve to ensure social, political, and religious pluralism. It is thus 
virtually impossible for popular self-government to be defeated by consolidation 
of control. 79 To argue that government was perceived by the Framers as a 
necessary evil is probably less accurate than to suggest that the Constitution 
was drafted in such a way that made the cooperation of competing interests 
71. B. ScHWARTZ, 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 439 (1971). 
72. "[A) bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against tv")l govmzmmt on ~arth, 
general or particular." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), r~print~d 
in JEFFERSON, supra note 62, at 140 (emphasis added). 
73. BURNS, supra note 69, at 542-43. 
74. Meiklejohn, TM First Amendmmtls An Absoluu, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 264 [hereinafter 
cited as Meiklejohn, An AbsoluU). 
75. /d. at 256. See also BeVier, supra note 67. 
76. Meiklejohn, An AbsoluU, supra note 74, at 255. Meiklejohn's goal appears to be the 
acquisition by voters of "intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous welfare" - a weighty 
purpose indeed for speech to play. &~ also Meiklejohn, Th First Amendment and tM Evils that 
Congr~ss Has a Right to Prtvmt, 26 IND. L.J. 477, 488 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Meiklejohn, 
Evils). 
77. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973). See also Finnis, supra note 68, at 238. 
78. BURNS, supra note 69, at 60-61. 
79. Id. 
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the price for protecting the liberty of each. H(I In short, the guarantee of free 
speech was a means for enabling the expression by the citizens of their will 
in the representative government established by the Revolution and Consti-
tution. HI 
Thus, the narrowest historical interpretation of the free speech clause limits 
its protection to speech with political content.H2 (The Court's willingness to 
protect the wearing of a jacket with offensive words lettered on itH:1 or black 
armbands in school can be explained by the political nature of resistance to 
the unpopular Vietnamese war.)R4 The broadest interpretation of the first 
amendment comes from those who find an absolutist intent on the part of 
the Framers. H5 But the Court has adopted neither of these extremes. Instead, 
80. Assuming that an inquiry into the Framers' intent is basic to delineating the scope 
of the free speech guarantee, such inquiry yields one of the strongest arguments against protecting 
racial defamation. Group libel deliberately exacerbates group tensions, playing negatively upon 
the heterogeneous character of American society. The stirring up of racial or ethnic "fears, hate, 
guilt and greed," D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 59 (1973), is fundamentally 
opposed to the Framers' intent to enSure cooperative social pluralism. Insofar as differences of 
opinion are protected by the first amendment, the tenor of debate may be anywhere between 
polite . and bitterly caustic. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). But 
racial defamation is essentially different. By casting contempt on a group on the basis of race 
or ethnicity, the goal is not to participate in debate founded on the principle of pluralism, but 
to destroy it. In this sense, racial defamation is subversive speech. Unlike political extremism, 
in which (however distorted its form) the Framers' principle of self-government is evident, the 
principle underlying racial defamation is pure discrimination. Invidious race and ethnic discrim-
ination has been rejected as antithetical to American national policy. See Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The positive intent of the Framers to found a nation based 
on pluralism should not, therefore, be distorted to tolerate the free rein of vindictive attack which 
is unrelated, except in appearance, to a constitutional or national purpose. See, e.g., EpSTEIN & 
A. FOSTER, THE RADICAL RIGHT 40 (1967); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 581-583, 602 (1980) [hereinafter cited as LASSWELL & CHEN); 
Brown, Racialism and the Rights oj Nations, 21 NOTRE DAME LAw. 1, 13 (1945); Note, supra note 
52, at 854. See also irifra the discussion in text accompanying notes 277-91. 
81. The free speech guarantee is thus a means to an end, not an end in itself. See Schauer, 
Speech, supra note 63, at 920 ("free speech is seen as an instrument of good, not as a good In 
itself'). See also BURNS, supra note 69, at 62: 
Both sides [federalists and anti-federalists) invoked the Declaration of Independence 
and its call for the supreme values of liberty and equality. But '.:"hat kind of liberty 
and equality? . . . [T)he issue that would become the grandest question of them all 
- the extent to which government should interfere with some persons' liberties in 
order to grant them and other persons more liberty and equality - this issue lay 
beyond the intellectual horizons of virtually all the debates of the time. 
82. See, e.g., F. SCHAUER, THE LAw OF OBSCENITY 13-14 (1976) (discussing freedom of 
the press) [hereinafter cited as ScHAUER). 
83. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New 
York v. Ferber, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 285, 286-87 [hereinafter cited as Schauer, Codifying). 
84. See also P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, supra note 52, at 629 for a discussion of Street 
v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (flag burning treated as political symbolic speech). 
85. See Meiklejohn, An Absolute, supra note 74 for discussion of the views of various 
"absolutists. " 
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it has identified political speech as merely the central value to be protected. 
Such evaluation logically requires consideration of content. K6 
B. Content Evaluation in Claims for Free-Speech 
Protection: Theories and Results 
Judicial analysis of claims to free-speech protection generally results in 
one of three conclusions: (a) the act in question is fully within the ambit of 
the guarantee, and may be regulated only according to time, place and manner 
(such as political speech);R7 (b) the act is outside the reach of the first amend-
ment, which does not protect every kind of expression, e.g., obscenity;KR or 
(c) its content is at least tangentially within the protection of the amendment, 
but competing factors may outweigh the speech to such an extent that gov-
ernmental restrictions beyond mere time, place and manner regulations are 
permissible (such as "fighting words").R9 Usually, but not always, the com-
peting factors in this last category are contextual. In some cases, otherwise 
protected content may be outweighed by its socially harmful nature or its 
minimal relationship to constitutionally protected, valuable speech.90 
Every first amendmentlfree speech case, therefore, necessarily presents 
an appellate court with a question of content or context, or both. Category 
(c), covering everything from commercial speech to soft-core pornography, 
has often functioned as a catchall category and has been enveloped by the 
murky waters of first amendment analysis. 9' 
Ultimately a more realistic assessment of the Court's treatment of the 
speech guarantee, and the most accurate prediction of future holdings, is not 
86. The motivation behind particular protected speech cannot be questioned as a basis 
for regulation. Cj Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 138-39 
(1960) (protected speech aimed at elimination of competition does not violate antitrust laws); 
Henrico Professional Firefighters v. Board of Supervisors, 649 F.2d 237, 245 n.12 (1981) (speaker's 
motivation is irrelevant in first amendment analysis). Any analysis of a speaker's motivation 
would necessarily scrutinize both the sincerity of his belief in certain ideas and his reasons for 
expressing them. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 64-66 (1975). See gmerally 
Finnis, supra note 68, at 222-23. 
87. See P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, supra note 52, at 513-14. 
88. Schauer, Speech, supra note 63, at 910. 
89. Schauer, Codifying, supra note 83, at 305. 
90. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982), illustrates that otherwise protected 
content may be regulated because of its socially harmful nature. The Court construed a New 
York State statute prohibiting the distribution of non-obscene material depicting a minor engaged 
in sexual activity. Although the material was described as "child pornography," the defendant 
was not prosecuted under the obscenity portion of the statute (which also prohibited the distribution 
of such material). Because of the harmful nature of the material and its minimal social value, 
the Court upheld the conviction irrespective of whether or not the expression was obscene. 
91. Such legal analysis is distinguishable from factual conclusions about speech. See infra, 
the discussion of mislabelling the Nazis' Skokie speech as political. Once speech is found to be 
political, it falls into category (a). 
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found in any of the free-speech theories offered by courts and commentators. 
The Court, fundamentally, is result-oriented. Within constitutional bounds, 
it will consider the interests of the speaker in his expression, the state in its 
regulation, and the public in its right to know and to be free from harassment.!J2 
The plethora of first amendment analyses, the various tests, doctrines, and 
principles that many scholars are fond of creating and defending, provide at 
best the means by which the Court's eventual result can be explained. 9:1 Oustice 
Holmes is reputed to have admonished an attorney who had told the court 
it would either have to find in favor of his client or reverse a long line of 
precedents: "Young man, if this Court so desires, it will decide neither in 
favor of your client nor reverse a long line of decisions, and it will find 
appropriate language with which to do so. "t4 
In essence, free-speech claims that are neither clearly protected nor ex-
~luded fall subject to judicial weighing, or balancing. 95 The methodology of 
this decision-making process is variously described in first amendment juris-
prudence. The "preferred position" approach, for example, gives a pres-
umptive weight to the right of free speech. 96 The burden to overcome that 
presumption is substantial; in the absence of a showing of clear and present 
danger, or grave threat to public interest, the right of unfettered speech is 
92. David Reisman has set forth the parameters of the task with a precision that lays 
bare the challenge of this area of constitutional jurisprudence: 
What individuals and what groups should be protected against what sorts of statements, 
and by what legal mechanism and how at the same time can one protect legitimated 
social criticism and the give and take of democratic policy, and avoid prejudiced 
application of the law? 
Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 733·34 (1942). 
93. Defamation provides one of the clearest examples of the inability of theorists to agree 
on a controlling principle necessitating Ihat result. Since it is closely related to political speech 
(the primary first amendment value), defamation of public officials and public figures is protected 
(in the absence of actual malice). New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See 
Meiklejohn, An Absolute, supra note 74, at 259. Where a plaintiff is libelled, a state may hold the 
speaker to a much lower standard of fault. Set Comment, The Constitutional Law of Defamation: 
AT( All Sptakm Prottcted Equally?, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 166 (1983). Some commentators indicate 
that malicious public defamation and private libel are unprotected (category (b» because they 
lack constitutional value; others insist the speech is protected, but easily outweighed by the 
competing public interest in reputation (category (c». Su, e.g., P. BENDER & B. NWBORNE, supra 
note 52, at 514; SHAPIRO, supra note 51, at 157-59; if. Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violmce: 
First Ammdmmt Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123, 1184-85 (1978). Regardless 
of the jurisprudential theory, the result remains the same and no more clearly understood for the 
philosophical debate. 
94. BERNS, supra note 61, at 192. 
95. Su, e.g., Meiklejohn, Evils, supra note 76, at 484-85; Schauer, Speech, supra note 63, 
at 906. 
96. The "preferred position" doctrine is set forth in Thomas v. Collin, 323 U.S. 516, 
529-30 (1945), where the Court held that prior restraint on a labor organizer's speech impaired 
the rights of workers who had gathered to hear him. Although the Court occasionally disclaims 
the existence of a hierarchy among the fundamental freedoms it recognizes, first amendment 
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paramount. 97 According to some commentators, the preferred position doctrine 
merely distinguishes words from action;98 verbal expression of thought is 
protected, active expression is not. 99 
Others take the right further, interpreting it as one not merely preferring 
speech, but as a right of free expression, H"' even a right to be left alone. 101 
Such characterizations often run up against one another. In 1983, for example, 
a New York State court protected the "free expression" of one who showered 
aJewish neighborhood with anti-semitic leaflets. Without pausing for traditional 
analysis, the judge spoke of liberty, democracy, and free speech as one run-
on doctrine.102 (If the burden to overcome the preferred position of speech is 
heavy, it must be overwhelming to outweigh the ultimate "liberty, life it-
self')."1:l 
Still another approach is typified by the late Justice Frankfurter. He 
rejected the preferred position as overly rigid, choosing instead to weigh the 
liberties have enjoyed a favored position relative to the other guarantees contained in the Bill of 
Rights. The first amendment embodies "the indispensable condition of nearly every other form 
of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937); this language reflects the emphasis 
that the Framers placed upon fundamental freedoms. See Gard, The Absoluteness of the First Amendment, 
58 NEB. L. REV. 1053, 1074 (1979). These freedoms were a driving force behind the American 
Revolution and perhaps the main reason why the first federation was so weak. See A. KELLY & 
W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 61-62 (5th ed. 1976). Protection of free expression 
has long spurred the Court to take a more activist role. The concept of a limited federal government 
came to be diluted by commerce clause litigation; see E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 
(1983), Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); and passage of the fourteenth amendment; see 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
The federal judiciary has come to perceive that it has an obligation to protect individual rights 
against governmental infringement. This accounts for the incorporation of the first amendment 
into fourteenth amendment, thus making it applicable to both the state and federal governments. 
See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1981); R. ROTUNDA, 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 374-83 (1981). The preferred position of the first amendment 
stems from its application to the states. DOUGLAS, supra note 61 at 362. 
97. Stating that "free speech" occupies a preferred position takes a broader position than 
the Court's language in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945). The Court spoke of 
the burden of restraint of "orderly discussion and persuasion. 323 U.S. at 530. In the setting 
of Skokie, each one of these terms could be argued as inapplicable. If orderly, it was only 
superficially so. And neither discussion nor persuasion characterized the Nazis' speech." See infra 
text accompanying notes 245·51, 264-68. 
98. SHAPIRO, supra note 51, at 71. 
99. !d. at 55-57. 
100. Haiman, supra note 69, at 124. 
101. See, e.g., Haiman, supra note 69, at 113 (discussing Thomas Emerson's "full protection" 
theory); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1206, 1208 
(1976). 
102. People v. Downer, 6 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1938). The court concluded with the "hope that 
this defendant will soon relieve himself of the bitterness in his heart and help to spread good 
will towards all .... " Id. at 568. 
103. See Schauer, Speech, supra note 63, at 910-15 (rejecting the position "that freedom of 
speech is mainly an indistinguishable subset of a broader notion of individual liberty"). 
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specific interests before the Court. 104 Such "ad hoc balancing" may succeed 
in identifying rival or reciprocal interests,105 but it also leaves speech vul-
nerable.106 The state can usually offer a strong rationale for regulation in any 
particular case. 
A more protective alternative is "definitional balancing. "107 Types of 
speech, not individual cases, are balanced against free speech interests. Def-
amation, for example, as a defined type of speech lOR would be held unprotected. 
All of the formulas-preferred position, free expression, ad hoc or defi-
nitional balancing-attempt to formulate a methodology by which courts may 
proceed to adjust the interests before them. Regardless of the doctrine, however, 
those interests remain basically the same. 
The state's position is usually akin to the proposition enunciated by the 
Court in Cox v. New Hampshire,109 that civil liberties presuppose the existence 
of ordered liberty."o The challenged speech is said to threaten such order 
either directly, as through a breach of the peace, or indirectly, as through an 
injury to reputation, privacy, or some other right. II I But, it is argued, the 
threat of deleterious effect need not be tolerated; "the Constitution . IS 
not a suicide pact." 112 
In a contradistinction to the state's claims on behalf of regulation are the 
interests of free speech. Even under ad hoc balancing, courts look less to the 
individual speaker's right to deliver his message than to the people's interest 
in the free flow of information, and to the greater risk to liberty posed by 
establishing precedents for future suppression of constitutionally valuable 
speech.lJ:l 
104. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,90 (1949) (Frankfurter J., concurring). See SHAPIRO, 
supra note 51, at 89-90; Schauer, Speech, supra note 63, at 904. 
105. Su SHAPIRO, supra note 51, at 10 l. 
106. SHAPIRO, supra note 51, at 102. See also Nimmer, The Right To Spealc From Times to 
Time: First Amendment Theory Applied To Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 
938-41 (1968). 
107. Nimmer, supra note 106, at 942-48. 
108. !d. at 943. Not only does the state's interest in protecting individual reputations suffer 
if defamation is freely allowed, the free-speech interest itself is undermined by the spectre of 
"reputation assassins" able to verbally assault whomever they chose. [d. 
109. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
110. The statement, frequently quoted, reads: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which 
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses." !d. at 574. 
III. State criminal libel statutes embody the dual state interests underlying the claimed 
need to regulate speech. Although often treated as legal anachronisms (su, e.g., United States v. 
Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Md. 1974); Gottschalk v. Alaska, 575 P.2d 289 (1978», such 
statutes have not completely disappeared. See generally Note, Constittdionality of the Law of Criminal 
Libel, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 521 (1952). See also Note, Defamation of a Group, 21 NOTRE DAME LAW. 
21 (1945) (criminal libel may provide source of liability for defamation of group). 
112. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-160 (1963) Uackson, J.). 
113. By identifying competing interests, labelling them distinctively and assigning appro-
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Some observers have suggested that a major refinement of free speech 
doctrine is taking place, a kind of codification of the first amendment. II ' 
According to this theory, the Court treats the amendment as a constitutional 
umbrella under which a great variety of communicative activity and govern-
mental interests are adjusted. Rather than treating speech broadly as either 
protected or not, II> the Court identifies narrow categories and then applies a 
balancing analysis." 6 Indeed, Justice Stevens already posits a hierarchy of 
speech. The greatest protection is given to speech near the pinnacle: political 
discussion and debate. 
Although the Court has not formally adopted this model, the analytical 
approach taken in recent speech cases appears to conform substantially to this 
hierarchy model whether or not it is described as a heirarchy or codification. 117 
priate weight, first amendment articles, books and court opinions are made. In the latter, a court 
may clarify its constitutional analysis by using a result-oriented fact presentation. Compare Dennis 
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (height of McCarthy era) with Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 
298 (1957) (McCarthyism discredited). 
114. Schauer, Codifying, supra note 83. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) seems to foreshadow the concept of specialized communicative 
categories. 
115. The landmark case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) identified 
the types of speech considered outside the protection of the first amendment regardless of context: 
profanity, obscenity, libel, epithets and personal abuse. Although diverse in nature, they are alike 
in being marginal to the "marketplace of ideas." See Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Apart from these categories, limitations based upon content are examined 
carefully to ensure that they do not restrict content under the guise of regulating time, place or 
manner of delivery, or (where there is an allegation of clear and present danger, fighting words 
or breach of the peace) to determine that the facts are as grave as claimed by the state. 
116. Schauer, Codifying, supra note 83, at 313. Schauer lists the narrow categories identified 
in Ferber, each with "its own corpus of sub-rules, principles, categories, qualifications, and 
exceptions." !d. at 308-09. The advantage of narrow categories of speech is that courts need not 
protect marginal speech on the ground that state regulation might allow infringement of non-
marginal speech. !d. at 287. Schauer also notes the disadvantage of such categories, i.e., the 
difficulty that prosecutors and courts experience in applying different analyses to categories of 
speech. !d. at 288. Examples of protected marginal speech are discussed in the Jehovah's Witness 
cases, Bradenburg, Cohen, and Collins. [d. at 286-87. However, Jehovah's Witnesses present a 
quandry: the affirmative guarantee of free exercise of religion, as well as the free speech guarantee, 
compete against state interests in regulation. Cohen's speech was political protest, likewise dis-
tinguishable from Collins and Brandmburg; if marginal, his speech had, at least. a colorable claim 
to first amendment protection. Codification not only obviates the dilemma of protecting marginal 
speech, but also protects constitutionally valuable speech. Speech which is deemed dangerous or 
worthless is more easily identified. Since this conclusion is made in terms of the narrow category 
within which the speech falls, the elements (danger, worthlessness) are less likely to be diluted. 
[d. at 315. See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 115-16 (1980); Schauer, Speech, supra note 
63, at 908. 
117. In New York v. Ferber, 480 U.S. 747 (1982), Justice Stevens expressed the view that 
the Court's decision effectively adopted his approach, since the statute prohibited some protected 
activity, as well as unprotected activity. Since the basis of the Court's decision was that the evils 
to be restricted overwhelmingly outweighed the expressive interest, if any, Justice Stevens indicated 
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But the likelihood remains that the Court first decides upon the result that 
it thinks is fair, and then explains the result as a balancing of the category 
of speech involved, the value of the particular utterences, and the proffered 
state justification for punishing or proscribing the speech. I 18 
C. Hard-Core Pornography: What Free Speech Is Not About 
Regardless of the theory applied, political discussion occupies one extreme 
on the constitutional spectrum of verbal expression, and only the most com-
pelling proof of contextual danger will justify its regulation. At the other pole 
may be hard-core pornography. The Court does not allow hard-core porno-
graphic speech past the doors of the home, where the greatest privacy interest 
remains virtually inviolable. I 19 With that sole contextual exception, hard-core 
pornography is not considered speech for first amendment purposes,120 and is 
therefore subject to regulation on content alone. Indeed, the reasoning that 
underlies the Court's exclusion of this category from first amendment protection 
serves to clarify the meaning of "unconstitutional speech" (as distinct from 
the popular perception of speech) and appears to fit well within the codification 
theory. 
Fredrick Schaver has convincingly argued that hard-core pornography is 
not speech about sex, but a sexual surrogate intended to evoke sexual stim-
ulation or gratification. 121 It possesses few of the mental attributes characteristic 
of the intellectual, emotional or communicative process that the Constitution 
protects; the first amendment is simply inapplicable. 122 This particular inter-
action between speaker and publisher, or listener and viewer is not the process 
that the Free Speech clause was designed to enhance. 12:1 Thus, obscenity may 
that child pornography belonged where the court put it, "in its rightful place near the bottom" 
of the speech hierarchy. /d. at 781. 
118. For example, the Court has protected "speech that matters." Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). Likewise, in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 
(1973), Chief Justice Burger identified legitimate state interests as "stemming the tide of com-
mercialized obscenity . . . [,] the interests of the public in the quality of life and the total 
community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public 
safety itselq,] ... [a] right of tM Nation and of the States to maintain a decmt society." Id. at 57-60. 
The Court then balanced these interests against the content of the communication and any privacy 
interest implicated. See also Garvey, supra note 64, at 364 (as to children, the state's interest in 
teaching "its future citizens" things other than racial bigotry may outweigh the free speech right). 
119. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
120. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
121. See Schauer, Speech, supra note 63, at 922. 
122. /d. at 923. 
123. /d. at 918-19. Since Schauer rejects individualism as the basic free speech value, he 
posits that there must be "some particular value in what is conveyed" in order to justify protecting 
it under the first amendment. Id. at 919. Logically, he concludes, "[i]f there is a category of 
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be subject to governmental action for its essence IS a physical stimulus cast 
in the form of verbal expression. 124 
Those who wish to assert their right to choose for themselves what they 
see, e.g., people who enjoy erotica, may pursue other legal theories, such as 
the right to privacy. In short, the first amendment protects neither every 
conceivable use of language nor every form of self-expression, but only the 
"communication of ideas" in the broad sense of self-expression directed toward 
the intellectual or emotional faculties. 125 Advocacy of sex is within the purview 
of the first amendment; sex itself, by act or verbal surrogate, is not. Advocacy 
of revolution is protected speech; acts of revolution are not. 126 That every 
action may carry with it an implied advocacy does not bring all conduct within 
the realm of free speech.127 
Under this analysis, the line drawn around the first amendment in the 
older cases does not seem arbitrary at all. 128 Where there is neither "exposition 
of ideas" nor "communication of opinion," 129 there is no reason why the 
speech itself must be tolerated as a matter of constitutionallawl30 simply because 
an epithet was thrown instead of a punch, or a movie viewed instead of a live 
sex show. Group libel, like hard-core pornography, is not the type of speech the 
first amendment was intended to protect. 
III. GROUP LIBEL 
Group libel statutes are currently in the criminal codes of five states. t:!I 
In four of them (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Montana and Nevada), the 
utterance that, as a whole, has no value in the context of the justifications underlying the first 
amendment, and if this category ought not to be within the scope of the first amendment." /d. 
124. /d. 925. 
125. /d. at 923-27. See also Finnis, supra note 68, at 237-39. 
126. See Kingsly Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 
(1959) (first amendment "protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be 
proper"). By this distinction between acts and advocacy, Malcom X could not be punished for 
saying, "There's new strategy coming in. It'll be Molotov cocktails this month, hand grenades 
next month, and something else next month. It'll be ballots, or it'll be bullets. It'll be liberty 
or it will be death." THE VOICE OF' BLACK RHETORIC 22~ (A. Smith & S. Robb ed. 1971). 
127. Schauer, Speech, supra note 63, at 925. 
128. Professor Schauer writes that "the Court's decision to exclude obscenity from the 
scope of the First Amendment is not linguistic sleight-of-hand suggested by some commentators." 
Schauer, Speech, supra note 63, at 910. See also Finnis, supra note 68, at 227. 'Contra P. BENDER 
& B. NEUBORNE, supra note 52, at 570 ("a constitutional curiosity"); Haiman, supra note 36, at 
172; Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 93, at 1201. 
129. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
130. The decision in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), proves the rule. Though 
the language on Cohen's jacket was vulgar, it could be viewed as an essential part of the political 
message of opposition to the Vietnamese War and, accordingly, protected speech. See also P. 
BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, supra note 52, at 626 ("Offensiveness may also be deemed to be more 
often related to political expression than is eroticism"). But see HAIMAN, supra note 36, at 19-20. 
131. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-37 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 27-1 (Smith-Hurd 
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gravamen of the offense is the holding up to ridicule, hatred, or contempt of 
any group or class of people because of their race, color, or religion.1:!2 The 
Illinois statute, differing from that which was upheld in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 1:1:1 
specifically requires that the offensive speech be provocative of a breach of 
the peace. IH 
In Illinois, Massachusetts, and Montana, the statutes require a demon-
strable intent to defame. m Such a probative requirement is important, for 
without it, a statute might reach unsuspecting distributors of racially defamatory 
materials and thus be unconstitutionally overbroad. Indeed, the absence of 
intent as an element of the crime weakens both the Connecticut and Nevada 
statutes. 1:16 
The vague spectre of unconstitutionality restrains many legislatures from 
passing group libel statutes. In 1982, for example, Maryland considered but 
never enacted a group libel statute. The state's Attorney General offered his 
opinion that the Court's rulings in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1:I7 Ga"isonl:lR 
and Ashtonl:l9 effectively precluded enforcement of criminal libel laws. 14o Sim-
1961); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98C (Michie/Law. Co·op 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
8-212 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200-510 (1983). Two states have statutes that are worded in 
such a way that group libel actions could be brought under them. IND. CODE § 34-4-15-1 (Supp. 
(1984); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 43-1 (Supp. 1984-85). Neither statute specifically states that 
a member of a defamed group may bring suit; the New Jersey statute refers only to "the plaintiff," 
while the Indiana statute refers to the "aggrieved party." 
132. The Montana statute does not specify race, color, or religion, but uses the phrase 
"group, class, or association." The Nevada statute includes those. defamed to be "person or 
persons, or community of persons, or association of persons." Like the Montana statute, it does 
not specify race, color, or religion. 
133. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
134. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 27-1 (Smith· Hurd 1961). The legislative revision committee 
in Illinois believed that, insofar as the law of criminal libel was designed to compensate for or 
mitigate the injury to the victim's reputation, it had failed. Additionally, the committee believed 
that the criminal law should not be used to remedy private wrongs, a tort action for libel or 
slander being more appropriate and effective. Consequently, the theoretical justification for criminal 
defamation is the prevention of breaches of the" peace. C. BOWMAN, COMMITfEE COMMENTS (1970), 
reprinted in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 27·1 (Smith-Hurd 1961). The Illinois statute thus retains 
one of the principles of Beauhamais, reiterated by Justice Brennan in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 70 (1964): speech likely to lead to public disorders, such as group vilification, is not 
protected. 
135. The Massachusetts statute requires an "intent to maliciously promote hatred of any 
group," while the Montana law punishes one who publishes defamatory matter "with knowledge 
of its defamatory character." The Illinois statute uses the language "with intent to defame 
another. " 
136. One can argue that specific intent is unnecessary, i.e., publishers and distributors 
should be aware of the content of what they publish and distribute, and should be forced to 
make judgments about its libelous nature. 
137. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
138. 379 U.S. 64, 70 (1964). 
139. 384 U.S. 195 (1966). 
140. 67 Op. AIt'y Gen. Md. 48 (1982). The proposed Maryland statute was neither targetless 
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ilarly, the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives 
held hearings on proposed group libel legislation in 1963; however, no federal 
law was enacted. 141 
A. Beauhamais Is Still Good Law 
Group libel is a category of speech that has seldom been tested by the 
Court. 142 The last time a group libel statute came before the Court was in 
1952, Beauhamais v. Illinois. 14:l This case involved the prosecution ora white 
supremacist under a state law prohibiting any publication which exposed 
citizens to the traditional injuries of defamation (contempt, derision and ob-
loquy) by casting aspersions on their race, color, creed, or religion. 144 Against 
claims that the statute violated the free speech and due process guarantees of 
the first and fourteenth amendments, and was overly vague, the Court upheld 
the statute's constitutionality by a five to four split vote. 
For analytical purposes, the dissents in Beauhamais remain as significant 
as Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion. Justice Reed assumed the power of 
the state to pass group libel laws, but dissented on the grounds that the statute 
in question was too vague. 145 Justice Jackson agreed that group libel laws fall 
within the power of the states, though not that of the federal government; 146 
he dissented because the trial judge had offered the defendant no opportunity 
to prove a defense, such as fair comment, truth, or privilege,147 and because 
there had been no showing of a clear and present danger by the state. 14R 
Justice Douglas suggested that defamatory conduct "directed at a race or 
group in this country could be made an indictable offense," since "[l]ike 
picketing, it would be free speech plus;" 149 he would have required either a 
nor vague; for the reasons espoused by this article, it should have been regarded as entirely 
constitutional. 
141. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STAFF REPORT ON 
PROPOSED FEDERAL GROUP LIBEL LEGISLATION (Comm. Print 1963); See also HAIMAN, supra note 
36, at 90. 
142. The Skokie case was not a true test since tne legal basis for the town's position was 
context (not content) based restriction of the Nazis' speech. Moreover, the Court's denial of 
certiorari in Smith v. Collin did not constitute a decision on the merits and, thus, has no formal 
precedential value. 
143. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
144. The statute read: It shall be unlawful ... to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, 
advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state any publication ... 
which portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any 
race, color, creed, or religion which ... exposes the citizens ... to contempt, derision, obloquy 
or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots .... 343 U.S. at 251. 
145. [d. at 283-84. 
146. [d. at 294-95. 
147. [d. at 300. 
148. /d. at 302-05. 
149. [d. at 284 ("Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be which was 
aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision, and obloquy. ") 
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conspiracy or clear and present danger to support an indictment. lso Only 
Justice Black considered the defendant's petitioning for a redress of grievances, 
discussing public issues, and expressing views favoring segregation to be 
activities fully protected by the first amendment. 151 
Eight of the nine justices, therefore, believed that states could constitu-
tionally enact group libel laws. Indeed, there are sound reasons to believe 
that a properly drafted statute prohibiting defamation of a group on the basis 
of race, color, or ethnic group would pass constitutional muster.152 First, the 
Court has never specifically overruled Beauhamais; 15:1 to the contrary, the Court 
continues to cite it with favor. 1~.4 Second, the conceptual framework of Chaplinsky 
on which Beauhamais was grounded remains the starting point for first amend-
ment analysis. m Third, it can be argued that racial defamation is a form of 
verbal utterance that is either constitutionally non-speech (akin to hard-core 
pornography) or, like child pornography, so near the bottom of the hierachy 
of protection as to justify either state proscription or civil liability. 
Over the years, Beauhamais has been cited in support of a variety of 
propositions, including the right of a group to make assertions on behalf of 
its members; 156 the importance of narrow construction in a statute which might 
150. /d. at 284-85. 
151. [d. at 267-75. 
152. Joseph Tanenhaus devotes a major portion of his article. Group Libel, 35 CORNELL 
L.Q. 261 (1950) to the form and substance a constitutional group libel statute should take. He 
critically examines various state and municipal laws, together with any judicial reaction (though 
failure to utilize the laws in most cases resulted in an absence of interpretation). Several conclusions 
emerge: (1) there must be a well-defined or accustomed usage, in order to save a statute from 
being struck down as overly vague; (2) the proscribed content must be clearly defined, so that 
protected speech would not be swept within the ambit of the statute; and (3) the proscribed 
content must correspond to the justification by which it is outside the first amendment protection. 
Tanenhaus concludes that in the United States, the closer a group defamation statute comes to 
the traditional law of defamation, the greater its chances of being upheld. /d. at 281. Indeed, 
Beauhamais was upheld on precisely those grounds. Justice Frankfurter surveyed the law of libel 
in an extensive footnote, including the minor variations in different jurisdictions by statute, at 
common law, and under the Restatement of Torts. 343 U.S. at 255-57 n.5. He concluded that 
criminal libel "has been defined, limited, and constitutionally recognized time out of mind." /d. 
at 258. Justice Frankfurter also noted that "the rubric 'race, color, creed, religion' has attained 
[a) fixed meaning .... " /d. at 263 n. 18. &e also Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 698 (N.D. 
III. 1978). Su generally SCHAUER, supra note 82, at 154-66 (discussing overbreadth and vagueness); 
SHAPIRO, supra note 51, at 140-43 (discussing least restrictive means, narrowly drawn statutes, 
vagueness, and reasonableness). 
153. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), Justice Douglas' dissent expressly urged 
that Beauharnais be overruled as "a misfit in our constitutional system." [d. at 82. 
154. See notes 156-59, infra, and accompanying text. 
155. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky held constitutional 
a state statute banning "face to face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the 
addressee." /d. at 573. This class of speech is not constitutionally protected. /d. Those areas of 
speech in Chaplinsky subsequently foun'd protected by the first amendment (offensive speech, libel 
of public officials and figures) are clearly distinguishable from defamation of a racial group. 
156. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 
1, 184 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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otherwise be impermissably vague or overbroad; 157 the equal stringency of the 
Bill of Rights in the scope of its guarantees against the states and the federal 
government; ISH and the validity of social science research as evidence, even 
though it may not be absolutely conclusive or irrefutable. 159 
Each of these propositions is useful in buttressing the argument that racial 
defamation may be constitutionally prohibited or punished. The true impor-
tance of Beauhamais, however, lies in its assertion that the first amendment's 
guarantee of free speech does not protect libel. Justice Frankfurter's opinion 
addressed the issue directly: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and 
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'-
words. . . . It has been well observed that such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and mo-
rality.160 
Neither, Justice Frankfurter went on, were the due process or liberty clauses 
of the fourteenth amendment violated. 
Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally 
protected speech, it is unnecessary ... to consider the issues behind 
the phrase "clear and present danger." Certainly no one would 
contend that obscene speech, for example, may be punished only 
upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is 
in the same class. 161 
Beauhamais thus stands for the proposition that libel is non-speech. II;2 Those 
who question the vitality of Beauhamais appear to be analyzing the case with 
a single-minded tunnelvision; 16:1 in short, reports of its death have been" greatly 
exaggerated. ' , 164 
157. Gottschalk v. Alaska, 575 P.2d 289, 292 (Alaska 1978). 
158. E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.16 (1978), reh'g 
denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 
560 n.2 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
159. See, e.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
160. 343 U.S. 250, 255·57 (1952) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 571· 
72). 
161. [d. at 266. 
162. See infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
163. For other treatments of Btauharnais, see, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 
(1982); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 n.6 (1964); Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); State v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097 (Me. 1980). 
164. "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." Cable from Mark Twain to 
Associated Press (1897), reprinted in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 625 (15th ed. 1980). 
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Critics of Beauhamais, however, have suggested that its holding as to libel 
and the first amendment was overruled in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan." i5 
But that interpretation of Sullivan, which was expressly limited to actions 
brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct,166 is much 
too broad. In Sullivan, the Court stated that no category of speech falls 
completely outside of the first amendment,167 but the Court was simply ensuring 
that a state could not remove speech from judicial scrutiny merely by putting 
a label on it. 168 The Court, for example, has ruled that the first amendment 
does not protect obscene speech. 169 However, under Sullivan, it insists on looking 
behind the label to determine whether or not the challenged expression is 
truly constitutional non-speech. 
The case for private libel as non-speech is strengthened by the Court's 
continuing reliance upon Beauhamais. Several landmark obscenity decisions, 
notably Roth v. United States l7H and New York v. Ferber,171 cite Beauhamais to 
support the proposition that libel is not constitutionally protected. Ferber ex-
pressly characterizes the Sullivan holding as an exception to the Beauhamais 
rule. 172 If the Court had simply intended to support the idea that certain words 
are non-speech, it could have cited Chaplinsky. By pointing to Beauhamais, 
which concerned a group libel law enacted to address the public threat posed 
by racial bigotry, I7:l the Court appears to have gone further. This strengthens 
the argument that the Court would approve a properly drawn and construed 
statute or judicial ruling proscribing racial defamation of a groUp.l74 
165. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. F.C.C., 403 F.2d 169, 174, 173 
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Skelley Wright, J., concurring), uTI. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); United 
States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267, 1278 n.2 (D. Md. 1974); Garvey, supra note 64, at 362; 
Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note ·93, at 1200; Note, supra note 52, at 836-39. For a detailed 
argument that Beauharnais is "obsolete," having become "unhinged" by Sul/iuan, Cohen, and 
Gooding, see HAIMAN, supra note 36, at 91-92. 
166. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
167. /d. at 269. 
168. Finnis, supra note 68, at 229 (1967). 
169. Other forms of unprotected speech include, insurrection, contempt, advocacy of un-
lawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business. 376 U.S. at 269. 
170. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (utterly without redeeming social value). See also Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, ahistic, political, or 
scientific value). 
171. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
172. ld. at 763. 
173. Beauharnais v. I1Iinois, 343 U.S. at 258-63 (1952). 
174. The I1Iinois statute in Beauharnais included defamation of religious groups as well as 
racial or ethnic groups within its prohibition. This article would limit the reach of group libel 
to racial or ethnic defamation. Without doubt, religious bigotry has also been a source of social 
strife and individual injury. However, inclusion of religious defamation would open the courts 
to what could arguably be excessive entanglement with the free exercise of religion - a separate, 
affirmative guarantee of the first amendment. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 
504-06 (1952). Racial or ethnic defamation, when cast in the form of religious speech, can be 
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Justice Frankfurter summarily dismissed the argument that a clear and 
present danger must be proven before a speaker can be punished or re-
strained. m Only certain kinds of speech, such as political opinion, are fully 
protected or only subject to the state's fundamental interest in public order. 
Where speech enjoys a lesser degree of protection, the state's interest may 
extend to some other type of harm; decency, 176 reputation,177 and psychological 
injury,17H may constitute "substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent." 179 Ferber uses Beauhamais to illustrate that libel is not protected,IHn 
and suggests a "codifying" approach toward content regulation where, "within 
the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted ... over-
whelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake."IHI Ferber itself, 
involving speech not necessarily obscene, upheld that prohibition. 
Even if Ferber did not explicitly classify group libel as constitutional non-
speech, the content of group-targeted racial defamation may nonetheless provide 
a sufficient basis for state regulation. Thus, in a situation like that of Skokie, 
a finding of imminent public violence should not be required to sustain a 
group libel law. 182 
Other critics point to the Court's decisions in Ashton v. KentuckylH:! and 
Garrison v. LouisianalH' as further proof that statutes like the one upheld in 
Beauhamais would not survive constitutional challenge today. These critics, 
however, interpret those holdings too broadly. In Ashton, the Court ruled that 
Kentucky's common law offense of criminal libel was not enforceable as it 
was too indefinite and uncertain. 185 Since no Kentucky case had redefined the 
crime in understandable terms, and since the common law was inconsistent 
with constitutional provisions, the defendant's conviction could not stand. IH6 
Since group libel laws, however, are legislatively enacted, they can be narrowly 
drawn to remove uncertainty or vagueness. Citing Cantwell v. Connecticut,IH7 
regulated on racial or ethnic grounds. Genuine religious disagreement thus remains protected 
under both the speech and free exercise clauses. 
175. See text accompanying note 3, supra. 
176. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
177. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
178. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
179. Schenck v. United States, 248 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
180. 458 U.S. at 763. 
181. [d. at 763-4. 
182. See also Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976). To 
analogize the dictum in Young: few would march sons and daughters off to war to preserve the 
citizen's right to utter threatening, abusive, or insulting words, inciting hatred against racial or 
ethnic group of our choice. See text accompanying notes 87-90, supra. 
183. 384 U.S. 195 (1966). 
184. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
185. 384 U.S. at 198 (1966). 
186. [d. 
187. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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which had overturned the state's common law crime of breach of the peace 
based on indefiniteness, the Court said that such a law must be "narrowly 
drawn to prevent the supposed evil[.]"188 In Beauhamais, the Court found the 
statute in question to be "a law specifically directed at a defined evil, its 
language drawing from history and practice in Illinois and in more than a 
score of other jurisdictions, a meaning confirmed by the Court of that State 
in upholding this conviction. "189 Thus, Ashton is clearly distinguishable from 
Beauhamais. 
In Gam'son, the Court invalidated a Louisiana criminal libel statute which 
punished the malicious publication of anything exposing a person to hatred, 
contempt or ridicule. 1911 The statute further provided that "where such a 
publication or expression is true, actual malice must be proved in order to 
convict the offender." I'!J In finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court 
stated it could find no sound principle which could make one liable for 
publishing the truth, even if the publication was actuated by express malice. 192 
This distinguishes Beauhamais from Ga"ison; the statute in Beauhamais did not 
criminalize publication of the truth. But the primary holding of Gam'son involves 
criticism of public officials. The Court reiterated the position taken in SuI/ivan 
(criticism of official conduct by public officials is protected unless the speech 
is false and made with actual malice).19:! Ga"ison extends the SuI/ivan rule to 
include criminal as well as civil penalties; it did not extend the rule to 
defamation of private citizens as a group. Both SuI/ivan and Garrison are 
concerned at least in part with preserving the right to criticize government. 
Neither should be read to bar group-libel statutes. 
The constitutionality of laws proscribing group defamation by race or 
ethnic group hinges on the response of courts to several fundamental questions. 
First, is the deleterious effect of racism so substantively evil as to justify state 
action to prevent or counteract it? Second, even if there is such a compelling 
state interest, does the evil persist where whole groups, not individual persons, 
are defamed? And third, is group libel properly charactereized as speech, 
somewhere within the hierarchy of first amendment protection, or can it be 
classified as totally unprotected "non-speech?" 
B. Racism: "The Evil to be Restricted" 
Throughout both American and world history, racism has fostered the 
occasion for strife, violence, and misunderstanding. 194 In its institutionalized 
188. 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1966). 
189. 343 U.S. 250, 253 (1952). 
190. 379 U.S. 64, 65 (1964). 
191. !d. 
192. !d. at 73. 
193. Id. at 78. 
194. See gmn-ally Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology and Minon'ty Rights: Another 
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form of slavery, racism fuelled the major political CriSIS of the United States, 
the Civil War. As anti-semitism, it nurtured the single most terrifying episode 
of the twentieth century, the Holocaust of Nazi Germany. It has been used 
to justify the genocide of Armenians in Turkey and Eritrians in Ethiopia. 
Racism has been called America's "intractable,"195 most "baffiing"l96 problem. 
Is racism so firmly entrenched that anti-defamation laws are inherently futile? 
History demonstrates that racism is not unassailable. 197 Racially-rooted 
problems can be dealt with through the law, as was cogently illustrated by 
Arthur Larson in a 1969 article. 19B Hard evidence simply contradicts the two 
polar views: the law is useless to change attitudes or any gain achieved is 
negligible.I!"J Law in its legislative and judicial forms may be ineffective where 
overt racism is widespread and deeply rooted ,21M' but blatant prejudice has 
become somewhat anachronistic/III at least in the United States. 
In the international community as well, "man's most dangerous myth"202 
has been increasingly discredited. In 1959, following a rash of racist incidents 
in Europe and South America,20:! the United Nations adopted a Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination/oo which states:"[A]ny 
doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority ... is scientifically false, morally 
condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and ... there is no justication 
for racial discrimination, either in theory or in practice. "205 Not only does 
Look al Uniud Siaies v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 755 (1981); KERNER COMMISSION, NAT'L ADVISIORY 
COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 91 (1968); Brown, supra note 80. 
195. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 262, (1945). 
196. Bixby, supra note 194. ("the colored problem is the most complicated and baffiing of 
all our social problems"). Shapiro writes, "[T)he racial question is the one issue in American 
life that has at various times proved unamenable to the normal workings of the political process 
... to become a conflict of principle. Conflicts of principle are, of course, the one sort of conflict 
that a liberal democracy, whose life is compromise, cannot tolerate, for it is possible to compromise 
interests but not principles." Set SHAPIRO, supra note 51. 
197. See generally LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 80, at 197 & n.103. 
198. Larson, The New Law oj Race Relalions, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 470. Professor Larson was 
speaking specifically of white-black relations. The principles underlying his arguments are equally 
applicable to other forms of racism. See also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261·62 (1952). 
199. Larson, supra note 198, at 511-22. 
200. /d. at 514. His specific example was the failure of prohibition. 
201. [d. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Town Seeks Reason 
For Synagogue Burnings, Baltimore Sun, Oct. 3, 1983, at AI, col. 5-6. 
202. LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 80, at 569 n.176. The source of the quot,!!ion is A. 
MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE (5th rev. ed. 1974): "The 
popular categorization of race ... when indulging in 'man's most dangerous myth' are built 
upon vague, shifting, and erratic references." 
203. LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 80, at 585-86. 
204. G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963); 
See also The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
adopud December 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
205. G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963). 
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racism deny human rights and offend human dignity, it also constitutes "an 
obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and is a fact capable 
of disturbing peace and security among peoples.' '206 In times of hardship or 
stress, outbreaks of racial hatred and violence become an expression of frus-
trated anger, feeding upon itself in a vicious cycle. 207 The attacker identifies 
the victimized group according to race and, through a complex psychological 
process, conveniently creates a scapegoat. 20R Little, if any intellect is necessary 
to hurl racial epithets, paint a swastika, burn a cross, or blame a minority 
group for specific problems. 2("-' A "free and robust exchange of ideas"210 is 
nonexistent; there is an absence of debate by which the individual can make 
up his own mind on the basis of all the evidence and on every political or 
moral issue. 211 Thus, racial defamation short-circuits the democratic principles 
of self-government. 212 By threatening these basic principles, racism becomes 
a substantive evil not only to those persons directly targeted, but also to all 
of society. 
C. The Interrelationship of Groups and Individuals: Interest and Injury 
An intimate nexus exists between individuals and the groups or associations 
to which they belong. Procedurally, associations may assert the rights of their 
members.213 In one pre Sullivan case, the Supreme Court relied on the rationale 
206. G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963). 
207. See G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 221-42, 343-53 (1954); Can The Klan 
Come Back?, READER'S DIGEST 197, September 1983, [hereinafter cited as Can The Klan Come 
Back?); Hard Times Trigger Racial, Religious Hale, II HUM. RTS. 7 (1983). 
208. ALLPORT, supra note 207, at 243-60. 
209. Seymour Lipset suggested in THE SOURCES OF THE "RADICAL RIGHT," reprinted in THE 
RADICAL RIGHT 289 (D. Bell ed. 1963) that after the Second World War, anti-communist crusades 
became the vehicle for hostilities formerly directed against Jews; as anti-semitism fell into disrepute, 
McCarthyism increased. Lipset's theory was correct: once McCarthyism declined, both racism 
and its anti-semitic variant again became the outlet for "white [Gentile) supremacy, cloaked in 
patriotism and religion." Can The Klan Come Back?, supra note 207, at 203. 
210. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973). 
211. Wellington, On Freedom tif Expression, 88 YALE LJ. 1105, 1135 (1979). 
212. The danger to "ordered liberty" is not merely violent disruption of public order. In 
Nazi Germany, the Nazi leaders utilized a more insidious approach, but one no less dangerous 
to democratic pluralism than overt violence. They "aim[ed) at the political annihilation of groups 
... and use[d) violence only incidentally." Reisman, supra note 92, at 753. Both Justice Douglas, 
dissenting in &auhamais, and Professor Shapiro, discussing the future of the first amendment, 
seem not to have considered this subtle danger, equating it simply with overtly violent conspiracy 
or action, "something close 10 a new civil war." SHAPIRO, supra note 51, at 158. Similarly, the 
F.C.C. in 1972 refused to ban the continued broadcasting of a white supremacist candidate for 
the U.S. Senate, arguing that it did not rise "above the level of public inconvenience, annoyance, 
or unrest," and that no clear and present danger was posed. See infra text accompanying note 
277. 
213. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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in Beauharnais in holding that individual black citizens could be injured through 
a defendant's libelous characterizations of the Negro race. m Most courts, 
however, are either unable or unwilling to depart from the traditional theory 
that redress is available only where an individual has been injured. 
America remains a melting pot, with perhaps broader ethnic diversity 
than any other society in the world. It has almost literally torn itself apart to 
effect racial integration. When society permits destructive attacks on a group, 
individuals within that group inescapably suffer.21:' Where Jews or blacks are 
defamed as a group, the speaker's target is each Jew or black. The same is 
true of other racial or ethnic denominations. A neo-Nazi who bemoans the 
fact that Hitler "didn't finish the job" (of exterminating Jews) is not likely 
to turn to a Jewish person and say, "Of course, I didn't mean to include 
you. "216 
One type of paranoia is the projection by one group upon another of its 
own low self-esteem. m As libel laws traditionally focuses upon the individual, 
psychiatrists too have concerned themselves primarily with the pathology of 
individual paranoia. However, in light of the conflicts, misunderstandings, 
acts of violence, and "deaths on a massive scale" which group paranoias have 
caused, "psychiatrists may come to identify them as the most serious pathogenic 
factors in our era.' '218 In short, injury to the self, between individuals, and 
among groups is inflicted by the paranoia from which racism springs, and of 
which racial defamation is but one expression. 
Private victims of defamation are more entitled to redress their injuries 
than public figures; they have not chosen to lead a public life or speak out 
on public issues as to make themselves a target for attack.219 Additionally, a 
private person's capacity for self-help is more limited than a public figure's.22o 
Persons targeted by reason of their racial or ethnic identity are in the same 
position: they have not chosen their ancestry, which the speaker treats less as 
214. Communist Party of the United States v, Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 
I, 184 (1961). 
215. See Nimmer, supra note 106, at 949-50; Reisman, supra note 92, at 731; Tanenhaus, 
supra note 152, at 261. 
216. Professor Reisman appears to be preoccupied with the form of the statement over its 
substance when he ponders whether or not "virulent attacks are actually libellous or slanderous." 
His example, "If I had my way, I would hang all the Jews in this country," seems clearly 
racially defamatory. It should not be necessary for racial defamation to take some particular form, 
such as an accusatory slur or epithet. Reisman, supra note 92, at 751 (quoting People v. Ninfo, 
Stenographer's Minutes 9-10 (Manhattan Magis. Ct. 7th Dist. decided Sept. 20, 1939». 
217. Pinderhughes, Understanding Black Power: Processes and Proposals, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1552, 1557 (1969), reprinted in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 89- 91 (1973). 
218. ld. 
219. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974). 
220. /d.; See also Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308, 328 (1979). 
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an objective fact than a subjective source of of disparagement. 221 Thus, in-
dividual members of the group are all the more vulnerable to the defamatory 
speech.~n 
Older cases suggest that the very breadth of the libel, which casts aspersion 
wholesale upon a large population of diverse individuals, undercuts the charges. nl 
But this approach presupposes a more rational response by the speaker's 
audience than experience with racial defamation warrants. ~~4 It also fails to 
221. See DOWNS, COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACISM IN AMERICA AND How To COMBAT IT 
5-6 (1980), repn'nted in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 87-88 (1973). Allport describes 
the process: "An imaginative person can twist the concept of race in almost anyway he wishes, 
and cause it to configurate and 'explain' his prejudices." ALLPORT, supra note 207, at 85 (1973). 
Set also LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 80, at 569 ("a race is any group of people whom they 
choose to describe as a race") (quoting A. MONTAGU, STATEMENT ON RACE (3d ed. 1972). NEIER, 
supra note II, at 17, indicates that, during bitter in-fighting among the various neo-Nazi groups, 
rivals of Frank Collin accused him of having Jewish blood. 
222. Neier also indicates that in Nazi Germany, those persons of Jewish background who 
had converted to Christianity nevertheless were classified as Jews. The label was applied for the 
benefit and purposes of the attackers, rather than to reflect any scientific or objective fact. NEIER, 
supra note 11, at 26. Set also LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 80, at 580. The concept of race is 
at best amorphous, since "[rJaces change, die, merge within other races, become modified by 
racial intermarriage .... Race is manifestly a transitory race." Brown, supra note, at II. 
Recently, a Louisiana woman challenged her racial classification, under a state statute which 
labelled her legally "colored" on the basis of one-thirty second Negro ancestry. Jane Doe v. 
Louisiana, No. CA-1120 (4th Cir. Ct. App. reh'g granted Dec. 20, 1985). The fallacious nature 
of such a racial classification system had resulted in the repeal of the law. In some families where 
negroid and caucasian genetic characteristics are present, there may be children who look "black" 
and others "white." The apparently "white" children may make an affirmative self-identification 
of themselves as black (but probably not vice versa). Conversation with D. Bruce Hanson, Center 
For Community Change, Wash., D.C. (August 27, 1983). 
223. Reisman, supra note 92, at 770. 
In Pcople v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1938), the court opined that 
the law need not be stretched to protect against group libel. Abuse of freedom of speech would 
be effectively restrained by the speakers' good sense or, that failing, by awareness that defamatory 
attacks are self-defeating. Id. at 143, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 259. One wonders at what distance from 
reality this judge lived. 
Set also Tanenhaus, supra note 152, at 266-273 (discussing old English and American criminal 
libel cases involving Jews, civil war veterans and Knights of Columbus); Note, DljtlfTUllion oj A 
Group, 21 NOTRE DAME LAw. 21,22 (1945). 
224. Stt ALLPORT, supra note 207, at 85. Set groera/ly Reisman, DmJocracy and Dljamalion: 
Fair Game and FaiT Commrol, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1942) (discussing use of libel and slander 
by fascists) [hereinafter cited as Reisman, Fair GameJ. An illustration is provided infra note 277 
and accompanying text. 
Judicial tolerance of racial defamation, demonstrated in, t.g., People v. Edmondson, 168 
Misc. 142, 154, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268-69 (1938) ("It is wiser to bear with this sort of scandal-
mongering ... We must suffer the demagogue and the charlatan, in order to make certain that 
we do not limit or restrain the honest commentator on public affairs") reflects a persistent 
allegiance to the marketplace of ideas. The hard case of racism, especially in its extreme form, 
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account for the destructive nature of racism upon society.225 Whether or not 
a particular racial characterization can be "proven true" is a straw issue 
which often plays into the hands of the defamer. 226 
When the John Birch Society accuses someone of being a "communist," 
denial alone is not a complete cure for the injury to reputation. A black 
individual may be in a worse position when subjected to the slander, "niggers 
are rapists", or "blacks are genetically inferior." The group smear inevitably 
has some factual relevance,227 however tenuous, for some blacks are convicted 
rapists and some have low I.Q. 'so Thus, a statement's deleterious effect may 
not be so easily remedied. Racism is thus made all the more intractable. 
The traditional arguments against the constitutionality of the group libel 
laws are that injury requires direct defamation of the individual and that 
society is stronger for permitting self-expression through the intentional infl-
iction of injurious racial attacks. 228 These arguments are unpersuasive in the 
light of history, social science, and common sense. 
One commentator naively suggests that "in the absence of confrontations 
with group libel, the ability of citizens to respond intelligently and effectively 
to racist rhetoric would shrivel up from disuse.' '229 The citizens of Germany 
e.g., Hitler's genocidal practices, is, however, an invariable part of marketplace discussions. Su, 
t.g., Schauer, Spttch, supra note 63, at 915·16, (slavery was not a wise policy, Nazism was not 
correct); Wellington, supra note 211, at 1132. 
225. Lipset, supra note 209, at 298 also indicates the long- term effect that even an episodic 
wave of hate-mongering can have on the social fabric. His illustration is the restrictive immigration 
laws passed in the early 20th century. 
226. Reisman, Fair Game, supra note 224, at 1089-1101 (describing the European experience). 
227. See Tanenhaus, supra note 152, at 293. Tanenhaus concludes that the problem of 
"proof' is a major stumbling block to the enforcement of group libel law. But the judiciary is 
clearly capable of drawing the necessarily fine lines involved in speech claims, so the first 
amendment is not merely "an unlimited license to talk." Su Kongisberg v. State Bar of Cal., 
366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961). Courts should be able to address relativity and partial truth in group 
libel, as they do for individuals. 
228. Set, t.g., Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286- 87 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
Thomas v. Collin, 323 U.S. 516, 545-46 (1945) Oackson, J., concurring); People v. Edmondson, 
168 Misc. 142, 154,4 N.Y.S. 2d 257, 268-69 (1938); DOUGLAS, supra note 61, at 363. P. BENDER 
& B. NEUBORNE, supra note 52; at 570; Garvey, supra note 64, at 363; Wellington, supra note 
211, at 1131-34; Note, supra note 52, at 854 (discu~sing from the perspective of radical black 
speech); Note, supra note 48, at 498. 
229. HAIMAN, supra note 36, at 98-99. Professor Haiman articulates four other reasons to 
rebut the argument that the first amendment does not protect group libel because the laller is 
socially worthless. First, he states that racially defamatory statements, e.g., "Jews control the 
media," are not empirically verifiable or falsifiable. But even if one cannot prove or disprove 
that Poles are dumb, Jews crafty, blacks lazy, or Italians greasy - such characterizations are 
fundamentally counter-productive in a free society. If a jury decides that the speaker's motivation 
was malicious, the speaker is no more protected by the first amendment than is one who defames 
an individual. Second, who is to decide what is "socially worthless"? (The jury in every case.) 
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had ample opportunity to respond intelligently to Nazi racism; their failure 
to do so resulted in one of the greatest tragedies of all time.23° 
The issue is really twofold: whether or not the law is ready to recognize 
the harmful effects of group libel,vI and whether the courts are willing to 
accept group libel as an analytically sound basis for liability. 2:12 
IV. RACIAL DEFAMATION AS SPEECH 
Most courts are not oblivious to the patently offensive nature of racial 
defamation, and quickly condemn the message of the speaker. 2:1:1 But such 
condemnations generally come by way of apology for their judgement that 
the speech is political and, therefore, protected by the first amendment. Justice 
Black interprets white supremacist literature in Beauharnais as essentially the 
expression of political ideas. m Various commentators have taken the same 
approach, stating, for example, that Nazi speech (referring specifically to the 
Skokie situation) is political in nature,m and as such warrants the highest 
Third, a group member's emotional distress is the price he must pay for freedom of speech. 
(Why? The targets of "fighting words" and obscenity have remedies.) Fourth, the Court has 
been specific in requiring that fighting words have a direct tendency to cause violence, that personal 
libel must be provm, and that advocacy must incite imminent lawlessness to be restrictable. (The 
Court uses whatever language is necessary to reach its desired result. See note 101, supra, and 
accompanying text.) 
230. Not long ago a Swiss-born actor named Billy Frick was filming a television play on 
location in Germany. For the part, he wore a Nazi uniform and Hitler-like moustache. When 
he appeared on the streets of Munich, he was astounded by what he encountered. "The Germans 
still have Hitler in their hearts. Everybody wanted to shake my hand. Women embraced me and 
wept. An old man on crutches threw his arms around me and showed me his medals. There 
wasn't a single heckler." Stern Magazine, Aug. 18, 1971 and Oct. 15, 1973. 
231. See BURKEY, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1971), 
reprinted in D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 100-101 (1973); LASSWELL & CHEN, supra 
note 80, at 581-83; Tanenhaus, supra note 152, at 278. 
232. Reisman, supra note 92, at 772. Professor Reisman recognized the speculative nature 
of damages in group libel, suggesting that the appropriate relief might be an action in equity 
for an injunction. [d. at 771-72. See also Tanenhaus, supra note 152, at 290-91 (discussing procedural 
aspects). In Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 259 (1952), Justice Frankfurter indicated that 
whether or not racial defamation laws would solve the underlying problems, states should be 
permitted to handle them through "trial-and-error inherent in ... efforts to deal with obstinate 
social issues." /d. at 262. 
233. See e.g., Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 175 N.E.2d 162, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 
aff'd., 10 N.Y.2d 7212, 176 N.E. 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, mt. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961). 
234. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 270 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Smith 
v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 918 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
235. Schauer, Speech, supra note 63, at 919. Later, Schauer seems to have modified his 
position, suggesting that Collin's speech was not protected for its own sake - as political speech 
- but only as a "fortunate beneficiary" of the courts' desire to protect the broad category of 
political speech. Schauer, Codifying, supra note 83, at 286-87. Under the broad-category approach 
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degree of first amendment protection. Another, referring to the speakers as 
"extreme rightwing neo-fascists," nevertheless reminds his readers that "po-
litical dissent must not be stifled. "2:16 
Other expressions of racial and ethnic bigotry are variously described as 
ideas, views, and doctrines. Though not expressly labelled political speech, 
courts treat them as contributions to the democratic marketplace - where, 
for first-amendment purposes, there is said to be "no such thing as a false 
idea. "2:17 "Government cannot protect the public against false doctrine," wrote 
Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins. 2:l8 "Each must be his own watchmim for 
truth . . .. [since] our forefathers did not trust government to separate truth 
from falsehood for us.' '2:19 A state court once ruled that the speeches of George 
Lincoln Rockwell, former leader of the American Nazi Party, could not be 
abridged because if they were, "the preacher of any strange doctrine could 
be stopped. "240 Another offered the rhetoric that, "We must suffer the dem-
agogue and charlatan, in order to safeguard the honest commentator on public 
affairs. "241 
The first amendment arguably shields racial defamation for the same 
reasons that it protects other abhorrent speech. First, opinions (not necessarily 
the "truth") are best arrived at through the free exchange of discussion and 
persuasion.242 Second, the risk to democracy from any form of "prescreening" 
to the Speech Clause, marginal speech must be protected to ensure that genuine political speech 
is not abridged. Under a narrow categorization of speech under a first amendment umbrella of 
value, the implication is that such "beneficiaries" would lose their free ride. 
236. SHAPIRO, supra, note 51, at 136. 
237. Keeton, DifaTTUltion and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1245, (1976) (quoting 
Justice Powell in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974». This is the basis 
for Justice Douglas' dissent in Beauharnais v. Illill9is, 343 U.S. 250, 284-87 (1952). See also Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. F.C.C., 403 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Skelley-
Wright, concurring), uTI. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969) (speech approaches the area of political 
and social commentary). While the speech was anti-Zionist, it did not attack Jews as a religious 
group. Under the facts, Chief Justice Burger (then Circuit Judge) held that appeals to reason 
and to prejudice were impossible to separate. !d. at 172. Set note 274, infra, for additional 
discussion of this case. 
238. 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) Oackson, J., concurring). 
239. Id. at 545. 
240. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 175 N.E.2d 162, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, aff'd., 10 
N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, uTI. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961). 
241. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 154, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268 (1938). 
242. Set Garvey, supra note 64, at 361 (value of student free speech in the search for truth 
is training for adult participation). Professor Shapiro more realistically identifies the outcome of 
the marketplace model as "the tentative conviction that there is no absolute truth," and its 
corollary, that "adjustment between rival partial truths is better ... than adherence to one fixed 
mixture of truth and falsehood." SHAPIRO, supra note 51, at 53; Schauer, Speech, supra note 63, 
at 915-57 (history supports proposition that population selection among ideas arrives at truth 
more readily than governmental selection); Wellington, supra note 211, at 1134 (quest of democracy 
is formal justice and evolving truth); Note, supra note 48, at 498. 
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far outweighs any benefit from not having to deal with unpopular, alarming, 
obnoxious, or shocking ideas.24:\ Thus, political prudence, not political ideology, 
underlies the protection afforded racial defamation. 244 
In categorizing racial defamation as speech, however, courts confuse form 
with substance. Superficially, racists claim to merely express legitimate thoughts 
on the relations between social groups, ~rban problems, politics, or finance, 
often under the cloak of patriotism. 245 Racial defamation frequently resembles 
political speech. 246 However, one need scratch barely beneath its surface, 
though, to recognize that group libel offers no ideas, opinions, or proposals 
of substance or merit. It may be more accurately perceived as linguistic abuse 
(verbal assault on an unwilling target),247 the kind of fascism "which aims at 
political and economic annihilation of groups . . . and uses violence only 
incidentally, "248 a destructive form of twisted self-expression,249 or, most simply, 
scapegoating. 250 Just as a physical assault is not protected self-expression, 
neither should the verbal assault of racial defamation be miscontrued as 
protected speech. 251 Just as hard-core pornography is not permitted "talismanic 
immunity" from judicial scrutiny, 252 neither should racism be allowed to 
243. See DOUGlAS supra note 61, at 363; SHAPIRO, supra note 51, at 55; Krattenmaker & 
Powe, supra note 93, at 1213; Note, supra note 52, at 835. The adjectives are those of the court 
in Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 34-35, alf'd., 10 N.Y.2d 721, 
176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, C"t. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961). 
244. SHAPIRO, supra note 51, at 47. 
245. Can The Klan Come Back?, supra note 207, at 203. 
246. See note 207, supra and accompanying text. 
247. Reisman uses the term "verbal sadism." Fair Game, supra note 222, at 1089. Stt also 
Nimmer, supra note 106, at 949-50. 
248. Reisman, supra note 92, at 753. See also Reisman, Fair Game, supra note 224, at 1089 
(verbal attacks used in early stage,s of fascism, as an initial building and unifying anti-democratic 
tool, while the group is either small or weak). 
249. Garvey, supra note 64, at 365. 
250. See Nimmer, supra note 106, at 949 (freedom of speech as safety valve); D. BELL, 
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 59 (1973); Reisman, supra note 92, at 731. Arguably the 
interest is stronger, since racial targets are substantively injured by the content. The captive 
audience is harmed only by the context, a lesser infringement. There is some conceptual similarity 
between the captive audie'nce and the unwilling victimized group, so that protection of groups 
libelled racially is as significant as that of the captive audience. See note 52, supra. 
251. See Haiman, supra note 69, at 42 (discussing the position of Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 
i.e., some expression is "akin to a body blow"). 
252. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). Analogously, the reviewing 
court assesses the claim that allegedly obsence material has first amendment value. Courts gauge 
value by serious literary, educational, scientific or artistic worth. Additionally, the material may 
advocate a position or impart information. However, such a claim does not close the matter. 
SCHAUER, supra note 82, at 36-53. Of course, attempts to camouflage the nature of racial defamation 
may not even be made. Handbills circulated by the Nazis prior to their planned demonstration 
in Skokie contained statements blatantly derogatory to Jews; some denied the Holocaust or made 
otherwise false representations of verifiable historical fact. Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 
YALE L.J. 308, 331 (1979). The white racist campaign advertisement was similarly overt. 
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"demean the grand conception of the First Amendment. "253 
V. RACIAL DEFAMATION AS NONSPEECH 
At the very least, racial defamation is "covered but outweighed" ;254 in 
Justice Stevens' hierarchy of constitutional protection, it is mired very near 
the bottom. 255 
It is difficult to see anything about racial defamation that justifies its 
inclusion in the marketplace of ideas. The loss of a political-moral issue about 
which each must "make up his own mind"256 would not impoverish citizens. 
The political, economic, social, and psychological issues of American life would 
remain open for debate. Racial defamation can be proscribed neither as a 
"strange doctrine"257 nor a false idea, but as a form of assault. The speech 
clause protects the marketplace of ideas, not the battleground. 
The Court's treatment of the Religion Clauses of the first amendment258 
provides an apt analogy. These clauses guarantee to the individual the absolute 
freedom to believe whatever he or she wishes, but not the right to translate 
such belief into action. 259 The "preacher of strange doctrine"260 cannot be 
restrained from preaching, but the practice of the doctrine (strange or otherwise) 
may be regulated. 261 Thus, by analogy, individuals can freely offer racist ideas 
in the democratic marketplace of speech onry in total abstraction. 262 
253. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973). 
254. Schauer, Codifying, supra note 83, at 305. 
255. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 781 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
256. Wellington, supra note 211, at 135. 
257. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25,34·35, aff'd., 10 N.Y.2d 
721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, mi. deni~d, 368 U.S. 913 (1961). 
258. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof . . . . " 
259. "Freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of 
things, the second cannot be." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 396 (1940). This duality was 
reaffirmed expressly in School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962) (Bible reading 
in public schools struck down) and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing 
laws upheld). 
260. Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 281-82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 35, appeal dismiss~d, 
9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd., 10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836,219 
N.Y.S.2d 268, em. deni~d, 368 U.S. 913 (1961). 
261. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
262. It is arguable whether or not doctrinal and actual racial hatred are distinguishable. 
The expression of racist theories tends to expose the targeted group to bigotry and prejudice. 
The Speech Clause would protect an objective discussion of the South African system of apartheid. 
Similarly, the study of the Bible as literature would not violate the establishment clause. s~~ 
School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223· 25 (1963). However, even if apartheid 
is cast in its most favorable light, i.e., official interpretation, it is a doctrine of "separate but 
equal." In the United States, the conclusion is final: forced, imposed separation is inherently 
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As discussed earlier, pornography does not "preach sex"; it offers itself 
as a sexual surrogate; its purpose is to stimulate a response. 26:1 The Speech 
Clause of the first amendment does not apply to pictorial display so minimally 
cognitive and essentially physical. Analogously, racial defamation does not 
merely "preach hate"; it is the practice of hatred by the speaker, who seeks 
to stimulate his audience to a like response. 264 Racial defamation is a trigger; 
a whole series of emotionally conditioned responses follow. 265 The Nazis in 
Germany understood perfectly the rhetorical uses of racism. 266 Likewise, con-
temporary hate-groups manipulate the "boogie, "267 making little pretense 
toward persuasion but much toward prejudice. 268 
When the state treats racial defamation as constitutional speech or ad-
vocacy, it distorts the relationship between government and individuals. 269 The 
Speech Clause of the first amendment protects individuals from both direct 
governmental domination of opinion and suppression of unpopular minority 
positions through tyranny of the majority. But individuals abused on account 
of their race, color, or ethnicity are also entitled to protection. 270 When the 
uneq';lal. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1953). When a speaker advocates apartheid, 
he crosses an impermissible line. Arguably, his speech is inherently racially defamatory. See also 
Brown, supra note 80, at 3 (distinguishing the principle of unqualified racialism, from the implied 
racism of discriminatory and paternalistic behavior). But see Wellington, supra note 211, at 1131-
33 (arguing that there is no such thing as a closed issue, including the issue of genocide); SHAPIRO, 
supra note 51, at 135 ("we can never be sure that any statement is true. "). 
263. See text accompanying notes 119-127, supra. 
264. In Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 275, 211 N. Y.S. 25, 29, appeal dismissed, 9 
N.Y.2d, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd., 120 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 268, 219 
N.Y.S.2d 268, uri. rknied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961), the court acknowledged that "[g)roup hate and 
fear are stimulated and expressly intended to be stimulated in those ripe for it." However, 
applying the traditional danger test, the court found tloat Rockwell must be given a permit to 
speak, as any other "preacher of any strange doctrine," unless a showing of irreversible harm 
was made. /d. This is a classic contextual analysis. 
265. LAsswELL & CHEN, supra note 80, at 570. 
266. See, e.g., Bixby, supra note 194, at 753-60; Reisman, Fair Game, supra note 224, at 
1085-89; Reisman, supra note 92 passim; Reisman & Glazer, THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE DIS-
CONTENTED CLASSES, reprinted in THE RADICAL RIGHT 97 (1963) ("in America, Jews and Negroes 
divide between them the hostilities that spring from inner conflict .... ·In Europe the Jew must 
do double duty.") 
267. ALLPORT, supra note 207, at 85. 
268. See Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272,287·97,211 N.Y.S.2d 25, 41-44 (Eager, J., 
dissenting), appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791,175 N.E.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd., 10 N.Y.2d 
721, 176 N.E.2d 836, uri. rknied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961); Bixby, supra note 173, at 758-59. 
269. Reisman, supra note 92, at 779. 
270. See SHAPtRO, supra note 51, at 136, identifying, with regard to extreme right-wing 
neo-fascists, the problem of not stifling political dissent, while "thwarting their goal of creating 
situations of intergroup hatred and violence." /d. See also P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, supra note 
52, at 570, where the authors attribute, in part, the Court's treatment of obscenity to the inherent 
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government fails to intervene, non-speech succeeds in its masquerade.27J Vic-
tims can rebut by means of discussion and persuasions,272 but those are not 
necessarily the best means to counteract non-speech.27:1 
The proper analysis of racial defamation, as constitutional non-speech, 
would fully permit its regulation by the state. In Skokie, fears were expressed 
that the boundary line between protected political dissent and unprotected 
group defamation would be impossible to draw, and that an attempt to draw 
such a line could ultimately force democracy to give way to totalitarianism. 274 
In fact, Collin's defamatory taunts were deemed protected in the name of 
free speech, while the community's interests in privacy, reputation, and social 
order were allowed to suffer. 
To suggest that the law cannot distinguish between political comment 
and racial defamation275 is akin to equating Michelangelo's nudes with those 
in a 42nd Street pornographic bookstore. Still, courts rigorously scrutinize the 
line between the artistic and the salacious before granting first amendment 
protection. 276 Subtle line-drawing is also required in claims based upon free 
exercise of religion. Drawing the line between racial defamation and political 
comment is not nearly as difficult. 
VI. THE FORMULA: CASE-By-CASE DISCRETION 
Racial defamation occurs whenever the speaker's intention, or the per-
ceived effect of his speech, is to cast ridicule or contempt upon a racial group. 
In each case, intention and effect should be subjective determinations fully 
within a court's discretion. A judge or jury must be free to discern (and 
punish) bigotry masquerading as history or science.277 
difficulty of affirmatively proving the widespread social harms flowing from the speech. This 
conclusion applies equally to defamation of racial groups: its widespread effect, "unsusceptible 
of proof." !d. 
271. See Nimmer, supra note 106, at 933, 955. Much of the argument against racial 
defamation laws is bound up in rigid adherence to principle, and little of it addresses the central 
thesis of experience. 
272. There were cenain positive aspects which emerged from the Skokie confrontation. 
Many people were reawakened to the horrors of Nazism, especially the post-war generation. The 
community rallied in ecumenical fashion behind the rights of the survivors and against the Nazis. 
But these do not justify denial of government protection to the persons defamed in the first place. 
See also NEIER, supra note II, at 7-8. 
273. Nimmer, supra note 106, at 955. 
274. The Coun in Beauharnais rejected this scenario. 343 U.S. at 263-64 (1952). 
275. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 154, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257, 268 (1938). 
276. SCHAUER, supra note 82, at 156-57 (1967). 
277. For example, the following situations could give rise to a finding of constitutionally 
punishable racial defamation:- A radio talk show is discussing reparations for Japanese Americans 
interned in concentration camps in the United States following the attack on Pearl Harbor. A 
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Not all statements, of course, are so easily distinguished. Take the case 
of William Shockley, a Nobel Laureate in physics, who claimed, on the basis 
of certain intelligence tests, that blacks were genetically inferior. 278 Should such 
a claim be protected by the first amendment? According to the test suggested 
above, not necessarily: a court could constitutionally decide that Shockley's 
personal conclusion about racial inferiority (as opposed to the data itself) was 
wrongfully motivated and therefore defamatory. Similarly, where a study of 
illegitimate births indicated a higher percentage of babies born to single teenage 
black mothers than to single teenage whites, it could be defamatory for one 
to state openly that the study proved black females are predisposed to pro-
miscuity simply because they are black. 
Analogously, a court would be within constitutional bounds to hold that 
the display of swastikas does not contribute significantly to any important 
political discussion of fascism. 279 Although that movement's generic symbol, 
the rod and bundle of arrows, bears legitimate political connotations, the 
swastika was Hitler's personal symbol as well as the insignia for the Nazis' 
anti-semitic ideology of "Aryan" superiority. Its display is essential only to 
convey the message that genocide is justifiable.280 
caller expresses disbelief at the very notion, telling the Congressman who is sponsoring the 
legislation (a guest on the show), "You obviously haven't done your homework. Do you know 
what those people did? I know .... " Comments of caller to the Fred Fisk Show, 885 FM, 
Wash., D.C. (Sept. 16, 1983). The issue of American internment policy necessarily includes 
exploration of the rationale put forward at the time: namely, the perceived threat of Japanese-
Americans as a potential fifth column. Whether the caller's speech constitutes genuine discussion, 
or mere racially based prejudice and expression of contempt for the Japanese as a group, would 
be a factual matter to be determined in view of all the circumstances . 
• Prior to a planned demonstration, Nazis circulate hand-bills containing statements derogatory 
of Jews and denying that the Holocaust ever took place. See Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 
89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979) . 
• A political candidate issues the following statement: "I am J.B. Stoner. I am the only 
candidate for U.S. Senator who is for the white people. I am the only candidate who is against 
integration. All of the other candidates are race mixers to one degree or another. I say we must 
repeal the civil rights law, which takes jobs from us whites and gives them to the niggers. The 
main reason why niggers want integration is because they want our white women. I am for law 
and order with the knowledge that you cannot have law and order and niggers too. Vote white. 
This time vote your convictions by voting white racist J .B. Stoner into the run-off election for 
U.S. Senator." D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 357 (1973). 
278. See the discussion in Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308, 329-30 
(1979). 
279. This is possibly the critical element in the argument for regulation, at least under 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). If courts believe that defamation (including symbolic 
speech) of a racial or ethnic group could be a likely part of politically significant speech, they 
will remain unwilling to permit its regulation or punishment. 
280. A more likely modern question is how anti-Zionism fits into these issues. The conclusion 
of the court in Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. F.C.C., 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 
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Of course, a court would also be constitutionally capable of adopting a 
more libertarian approach without having to invoke constitutional necessity 
as its rationale. As the Court pointed out in Ferber, it will monitor not only 
the broad suppression of speech but the overprotection of verbal expression 
as well. 281 
VII. GROUP DEFAMATION LAWS IN OTHER NATIONS 
The test proposed above is necessary only under a constitutional form of 
government in which free speech is given an especially exalted jurisprudential 
status, i.e., only in America. But while the importance that American courts 
accord the first amendment may reflect a noble and commendable preoccu-
pation with fundamental liberty, the more restrictive approach of other western 
democratic countries is no less high-minded, and could well prove the wiser 
course. 
It is not only a nation's social philosophy which determines the degree 
to which it will dictate or tolerate a system of laws, but its historical experience 
as well. Sweden, for example, specifically bans the wearing of an unauthorized 
military uniform in public: "It is prohibited to carry uniforms or similar 
clothing that identify the political orientation of the person wearing the uni-
form. "282 Sweden also prohibits the defamation of a race: 
If a person publicly or otherwise in a statement or other commu-
nication which is spread among the public threatens or expresses 
contempt for a group of a certain race, skin color, national creed, 
he shall be sentenced for agitation against ethnic group to impris-
onment for at most two years or, if the crime is petty, to pay a 
fine. 283 
1968), etTI. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969), is probably correct. The court did not accept the position 
of the Anti-Defamation League, that anti-Zionism per se constituted an appeal to racial or religious 
prejudice. In the facts, no direct expression of anti-semitism was made. The court accepted the 
FCC's position that it would by impractical, indeed virtually impossible, to separate appeals to 
reason from appeals to prejudice. Id. at 172. But a direct appeal to anti-semitism would be 
separable. Chief Justice Burger (then circuit court judge) reminded the FCC of its "duty to 
consider a pattern of libellous conduct," treating it as distinct form the merely unpopular speech 
anti-Zionism was found to be. /d. 
281. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Cj infra discussion accompanying note 
292. 
282. This prohibition also applies to parts of uniforms, i.e., arm bands, and other similar 
clearly visible means of identification. Violations are punishable by day fines (determined by one 
day's income). SFS 19947: 164. 
283. SWED. PENAL CODE ch. 16 § 8 (1972). In Canada, a Special Committee on Hate 
Propaganda reported: 
While ... over the long run, the human mind is repelled by blatant falsehood and 
seeks the good, it is too often true, in the short run, that emotion displaces reason 
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These laws, enacted after the Second World War, were a response to the 
horrors of the Holocaust. Taken together, it seems clear that a march of Nazis 
through the streets of Stockholm would be preventable as a clear violation of 
the law, unprotected by any claims of "fundamental freedom." While such 
provisions would quickly be challenged in the United States and likely be 
found wanting under the Constitution, in Sweden they remain accepted, 
untested, and innocuous. ~H4 
In Denmark as well, sharp limitations are placed upon speech that amounts 
to racial defamation. Section 140 of the Danish Criminal Code provides that 
"[ a Jny person who exposes to ridicule or insults the dogmas of worship of 
any lawfully existing religious community in this country shall be liable to 
simple detention, or in extentuating circumstances, to a fine. "~H:' Section 266b 
further provides that "[a]ny person who, by circulating false rumors or ac-
cusations persecutes or incites hatred against any group of the Danish pop-
ulation because of its creed, race, or nationality shall be liable to simple 
detention or, in aggravating circumstances, imprisonment for any term not 
exceeding one year. ,,~"'; 
Likewise, group libel in Great Britain is punishable under the Race 
Relations Act of 1976, which provides in part that: 
(1) A person commits an offence if - (a) he publishes or distributes 
written matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting; or (b) he 
uses in any public place or at any public meeting words which are 
threatening, abusive or insulting, in a case where having regard to 
all the circumstances, hatred is likely to be stirred up against any 
and individuals perversely reject the demonstrations of truth put before them and 
forsake the good they know. The successes of modern advertising, the triumphs of 
impudent propaganda such as Hitler's, have qualified sharply our belief in the ra-
tionality of man. 
&t also Mermelstein v. Institute for Historical Review, No. C356542 (Los Angeles Cty. 
Super. Ct. decided Jan. 17, 1986) (court awarded plaintiff a default judgment of five million 
dollars, including four million and seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars in punitive 
damages, from Swedish publisher who had claimed that plaintiff misrepresented the truth 
about the Holocaust). 
Not all democracies would base the prohibition of racial defamation on legalistic or moral 
grounds. For example, as an Australian law professor recently told the author in a private 
conversation, the Nazis would likely be prohibited form marching in the streets of Sydney "because 
it would be bad for tourism." 
284. Interview with Gunnar Karnell, Professor of Law at the Stockholm School of Economics; 
Per-Erik Nilsson, Chief Ombudsman of Sweden; Thorsten Cars, Swedish Press Ombudsman; 
and Gustaf Petren, a Justice of the Swedish Supreme Court (May 1982). Bul Stt. Oberg, Is Swtdtn 
Ript For Racism?, Soc. CHANGE IN SWEDEN, Feb. 1983, at 6. (law and attitude-changing going 
together). 
285. DANISH CRIMINAL CODE § 140. 
286. DANISH CRIMINAL CODE § 266b. 
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racial group in Great Britain by the matter or words in question 
.... (3) In any proceedings for an offence under this section alleged 
to have been committed by the publication or distribution of any 
written matter, it shall be a defense for the accused to prove the 
that he was not aware of the content of the written matter in question 
and neither suspected nor had reason to suspect it of being threat-
ening, abusive or insulting. (4) Subsection (3) above shall not prej-
udice any defence which is open to a person charged under this 
section to raise apart from that subsection. (5) A person guilty of 
an offence under this section shall be liable - (a) on summary 
conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or 
to a fine not exceeding £2000, or both; (b) on conviction on in-
dictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to 
a fine, or both; but no prosecution for such an offence shall be 
instituted in England and Wales except by or with the consent of 
the Attorney- General. (6) In this section - 'publish' and 'distribute' 
mean publish and distribute to the public at large or to any section 
of the public not consisting exclusively of members of an association 
of which the person publishing or distributing is a member; 'racial 
group' means a group of persons defined by reference to colour, 
race, nationality or ethnic or national origins, and in this definition 
'nationality' includes citizenship; .... 'written matter' includes any 
writing, sign or visible representation.1~7 
In addition, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted 
model legislation in 1966 which reflects the position of other democratic nations: 
Article I. A person shall be guilty of any offence: (a) if he publicly 
calls for or incites to hatred, intolerance, discrimination, or violence 
against persons or groups of persons distinguished by colour, race, 
ethnic or national origin, or religion; (b) if he insults persons or 
groups of persons, holds them up to contempt or slanders them on 
account of their distinguishing particularities mentioned in paragraph 
(a). Article 2. (a) A person shall be guilty of an offence if he publishes 
or distributes written matter which is aimed at achieving the effects 
287. RACE RELATIONS ACT OF 1976, section 70, which amended Ihe Public Order Act of 
1936 by adding section SA, "Incitement to racial hatred." Parliament is presently considering 
a proposal to further broaden the statute. REVIEW OF PUBLIC ORDER LAW (white paper presented 
to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for 
Scotland by Command of Her Majesty, May 1985). 
As early as 1732, England recognized racial defamation as actionable. King v. Osborne, 2 
Barn. K.B. 166, 94 Eng. Rep. 425 (1732) (defendant was tried and convicted for accusing 
London's Portuguese Jews of racial murder). 
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referred to in Article 1 .... Article 4. Organisations whose aims or 
activities fall within the scope of Articles 1 and 2 shall be prosecuted 
and/or prohibited. Article 5. (a) A person shall be guilty of an offence 
if he publicly uses insignia of organisations prohibited under Article 
4. (b) "Insignia" are, in particular, flags, badges, uniforms, slogans, 
and forms of salute. 288 
53 
The precise way in which personal freedoms are or should be codified, therefore, 
depends upon one's orientation. That one system of liberty is superior to 
another is fuel for an endless debate, one as likely to have good arguments 
all around as it is unlikely to be resolved. 
It is also important to note that a large gulf can exist between the theory 
and practice of civil liberties. Sweden, Denmark, and Great Britain may 
deliver a good deal more liberty than they promise. 289 By contrast, few observers 
would characterize life under the Soviet Union's Constitution, a model of 
guarantees for the natural rights of man, as free by traditional democratic 
standards. 290 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The proper measure by which any personal liberty must be guaged, 
particularly freedom of speech, is the degree to which it allows an individual 
to impose his speech on someone else, and the deleterious effect his actions might 
have on others. If either is excessive, the liberty must be restricted. The effect 
of racial defamation is demonstrably deleterious to all persons within the scope 
of its contempt. It lacks constitutional value; its imposition is the verbal 
counterpart of a body blow to all persons swept within the scope of its contempt, 
as well as to the social fabric of American democracy. The ultimate liberty, 
after all, is not freedom of speech, but the right to live in peace, secure from 
harassment. 291 
288. EUR. CONSULT. Ass. DEB. 17TH SESS. 737-38 (Jan. 27, 1966). 
289. See generally Reisman, supra note 97. 
290. See R. SHARLET, THE NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION OF 1977 16-17 (1978); LEVITSKY, 
COPYRIGHT, DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY IN SOVIET CIVIL LAw (1979). 
291. See BERNS, supra note 61, at 245. "This nation should not permit a powerful group 
of Hitlers or Stalins, even if they are silent, to develop - no matter how honestly or sincerely 
they hold to the Nazi or Communist ideology. To the extent to which they art bred among us, 
they represent a failure on the pan of the law." /d. at 239. Berns is not alone among legal 
scholars with this view. Professor Edwin S. Corwin wrote, more than a decade before the Beauharnais 
decision: 
Freedom of speech and press has frequently more to fear from private oppressors than 
from other minions of government; conversely ... there are utterences which cannot 
be tolerated on any scale without inviting social disintegration - ... [incitements) 
to race hatred, for example .... 
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We have long refused to corrupt the first amendment by arguing that it 
protects obscene or dangerous speech. Utterances which cause damage to an 
individual's reputation are likewise left unprotected. Can one conceive of 
speech that is more damaging to a free and civilized society than racial h.atred 
and contempt, whether subtly undercutting human dignity or explicitly calling 
for the destruction of an entire race? Repressing private thoughts of racial 
superiority may be impossible, but prohibiting the free expression of the idea 
may be important to the survival of democratic principles. 
Five states currently have group-libel statutes in their criminal codes. 292 
Careful consideration of content-based exceptions to the free speech clause of 
the first amendment leads to the conclusion that all five statutes pass consti-
tutional muster. Beauhamais v. Illinois,29:l the leading case standing for the 
proposition that libelous utterances directed against groups are not protected 
speech, has never been overruled;294 indeed, it continues to be cited with 
approval by federal and state courts. 295 
Other democracies have chosen to protect themselves and their people 
by banning such verbal assaults.296 In America, the courts have ruled that 
Nazis must be permitted to march in public streets, but as Justice Blackmun 
rightly observed, "[e]very court has had to apologize for that result. "297 It is 
time for courts to stop apologizing, and to begin properly analyzing the nature 
of racial defamation. The legitimate interests of its victims, who in the long 
run include all of us, should not be sublimated to a blind (and in this case 
misplaced) principle. 
To believe that all ugly ideas wither when aired is the height of naivete. 
It casts contempt upon history and ignores the most frightening paradox of 
LIBERTY AND JURISDICTIONAL RESTRAINT, qUIJted in BERNS, supra note 61, at 149. Professor David 
Reisman wrote: 
"A public [policy) for freedom of speech or any other single liberty of like importance 
should ... have as its goal the maximization of its valid uses and the minimization 
of its invalid uses. How this is to be done, under the conditions of today, is a difficult, 
if not an intractable question of methods." 
Reisman, Civil Libmits in a Period oj Transition, Public Policy, Vol. III (1942), qUIJltd in BERNS, 
supra note 61, at 160. 
292. Set CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-37 (1960); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 27-1 (1979); MASS. 
ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 98C (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212 (1983); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200-510 (1983). 
293. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
294. 379 U.S. at 82. 
295. Set, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. 
Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sunward Corp. v. 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 602 (D. Colo. 1983); Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co., 
416 A.2d 1215, 1217 (Conn. 1980); DePhilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 
1039 (R.I. 1982); Leech v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 582 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tenn. 1979). 
296. Set supra notes 282-89. 
297. Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 916, 918 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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our time: that Nazi philosophy was born as a legitimate expression of political 
thought, that it flourished amid civilized German culture, and that it was 
embraced by the highly sophisticated German people. 
Punishment of racial defamation has not jeopardized liberty elsewhere, 
nor would democracy in America suffer were bigots prohibited from promoting 
hatred on the public streets. Skokie was merely a case in point. It should 
have taught us that the pith of racial extremism rests in the kind of fervently 
held beliefs, political thought, and "truth" which freedom of speech was never 
designed to protect. 
